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Abstract 
The overall purpose with this thesis has been to consider whether cross-border co-
operations funded by Interreg strengthen or undermine the nation-state. A case 
study has been carried out, where the South Baltic cross-border co-operation has 
constituted a case. The result is based on material of nineteen interviews with 
stakeholders from five different countries representing subnational level, national 
level and the European Commission. 
With the background of a developed analytical framework the establishment 
process and how different actors can influence the co-operation’s opportunity to 
be maintained or deepened have been examined. The establishment process was 
analysed from a decision-making model inspired by John W. Kingdon. How 
different actors can influence the co-operation’s opportunity to be maintained or 
deepened was examined from two different angles; the vertical dimension, 
representing actors from the national governments and the EU, and the horizontal 
dimension representing subnational actors. 
It was concluded that since national actors to a high degree drove the process 
to establish the South Baltic co-operation and are the ones that primarily 
determine the cross-border co-operation’s opportunity to be maintained or 
deepened; a cross-border co-operation like the South Baltic co-operation in the 
framework of Interreg, strengthens rather than undermine the nation-state. 
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1 Introduction 
Researchers in social science have extensively studied the changing role of the 
sovereign state and its alleged demise (Hurell 2007 p.197, Paasi 2002 p.71). It has 
been argued that national states “are hollowing out” due to a shift of power, which 
is taking place both upwards to an international level and also downwards to a 
subnational level (Baker 1996 p.44-45). Similarly it is claimed that the nation-
state experiences “the twin threats” of supranationalism from above and 
regionalism from below (Donnan et al 2001 p.1). This thesis draws attention to 
the asserted power shift to the subnational level and examines it in the context of 
cross-border co-operations. The result from the thesis will hopefully contribute to 
a clarification whether cross-border co-operations can strengthen or undermine 
the power of the nation-state. 
A cross-border co-operation is a co-operation between subnational units from 
two or more nation states (Perkmann 2007 p.254). Cross-border co-operations 
have grown in importance and have in recent years emerged within the entire 
European Union. There are several reasons as to why cross-border co-operations 
have become more numerous and why borders no longer function as they once 
did. To mention a few, the end of the Cold War created new possibilities for 
connecting previously peripheral border regions. Moreover, globalisation and the 
more knowledge-driven economy have reinforced co-operations across borders. In 
many cases it is argued that cross-border regions are a better creation of new 
functional economic spaces and are more natural economic territories than the 
states (Jessop 2002 p.37-39). The phenomenon of cross-border co-operations has 
furthermore been described as a strategy of response to pressures of economic 
globalisation and global environmental concerns (Scott 1999 p.606). 
However, the EU’s drive to greater economic and political integration is 
probably one of the most important explanations of the increased number of new 
cross-border co-operations within the EU. Different treaties and agreement have 
facilitated a rise of new cross-border co-operations. The Single European Act with 
its “four freedoms” of movement for capital, goods, service and labour, and the 
Schengen Agreement which resulted in the removal of systematic border controls, 
both constitute examples of how it has become easier to cooperate across borders 
and how national sovereignty partly has been weakened (O’Dowd 1996 p.11, 
Lavenex 2005 p. 460). 
Most essential for the establishment of new cross-border co-operations is the 
Interreg Community Initiative. The Interreg initiative is a tool for reaching the 
European territorial cooperation objective (objective 3). This objective compound 
with the Convergence objective (objective 1) and the Regional competitiveness 
and employment objective (objective 2) are the three objectives outlined in the EU 
Cohesion Policy 2007-2013 (Cohesion policy 2007-13 – Commentaries and 
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official texts, January 2007 p.10, 20). The three objectives within the Cohesion 
policy have a total budget of EUR 308 billion (European Regional Policy – The 
Basic Essentials, January 2007). 
The European Commission motivates Interreg funding aimed for cross-border 
co-operations with that competitiveness and prosperity is based on the capacity of 
the people to cooperate in forums across borders that share the same challenges. 
Problems are thus not always most efficiently solved at the national level (Turning 
Territorial Diversity into Strength – Green Paper on Territorial Cohesion, 
October 2008 p.3-8). Furthermore the Commissioner for Regional Policy, Danuta 
Hübner claims that the aims of cross-border co-operations are to put weight to the 
subnational level and promote a bottom-up perspective, where regional actors 
should be more involved in policy and decision-making processes (Inforegio 
panorama, June 2008 p.4). 
The readiness of the EU to support cross-border co-operations has in several 
contexts been interpreted as a desire to undermine the national-state system. This 
can for example be illustrated by a statement made by the president of the 
Transmanche Euroregion: ‘the European Union expects the regions to form 
networks, across frontiers, to enable them to counterbalance the power of member 
states’ (cited in Jessop 2002 p.40). Also O’Dowd claims that the EU’s policies 
acknowledge the weakening of sovereignty at borders and in some sense the loss 
of national state power (O’Dowd 1996 p.11). 
Consequently, a question that follows is whether cross-border co-operations 
somehow can be a threat and even challenges national sovereignty. The aim of 
cross-border co-operations in the framework of Interreg is to promote a bottom-up 
perspective, but does this diminish the power of the national governments? 
Another parallel question that needs to be addressed is whether cross-border co-
operations single-handedly have the power and potential to succeed or if their 
existence formost depends on the EU and the national governments. 
1.1 Purpose and research questions 
In line with the above discussion the main aim is to consider whether cross-border 
co-operations in the framework of Interreg are strong enough to undermine the 
power of the nation-state or whether they on contrary only may be an instrument 
in order to further the governments’ own goals. A closer structure of cross-border 
co-operation, where subnational actors to a high extent are unified and where the 
EU and the national governments intervention is absent, is expected to constitute a 
wider affect on the power of the national governments.  
The first question, which has a more theoretical character and will be the 
overall guideline for the thesis is: 
 
Does a cross-border co-operation funded by the Interreg strengthen the 
participating states as a whole or undermine the power of the nation-state?  
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In order to respond on the first research question a case study will be carried out. 
The South Baltic cross-border co-operation established in 2007, between the 
subnational units of Sweden, Denmark, Germany, Poland and Lithuania has been 
selected as case, due to several reasons that will be discussed in the subsequent 
chapter. 
In order to answer my research question stated above two specific and 
operational research questions are considered to be salient. The first of these 
questions, focus on the establishment process in order to clarify the driven force 
behind the co-operation and furthermore the role of EU and the actors at national 
and subnational level. Particular interesting is if the establishment process can be 
described as a bottom-up or top-down process. A top-down process implies that it 
is the national governments that have been the driven force, and they would then 
probably not see the new cross-border co-operation as a factor that undermine the 
power of the nation-state. Deriving from this statement the second question is 
addressed: 
 
What and whom drove the process to establish the South Baltic cross-border co-
operation? 
 
The third research question focus on present time and concerns what potential 
subnational actors have to maintain and deepen their cross-border co-operation 
compared to the EU and actors at national level. Once again, it is assumed that if 
the EU and the national governments solely influence and determine the co-
operation’s opportunities to be maintained and deepened, the cross-border co-
operation cannot undermine the power of the national governments. The question 
identified is as follows: 
 
How and to what extent can actors at the subnational level contra actors at the 
national level and the EU influence and determine the South Baltic cross-border 
co-operation’s opportunities to be maintained and deepened? 
 
In order to examine the three research questions some form of theory is required, 
which can navigate the analysis. An underlying purpose is therefore to develop an 
analytical framework that is suitable for the posed research questions. The 
intention to study both the establishment process and how different actors can 
influence the co-operation’s opportunities to be maintained or deepened is seen as 
crucial in order to be able to examine the first question. If the process was not 
driven by subnational actors or if the subnational actors are not compatible, to an 
extent where they by themselves can influence the co-operation’s opportunities to 
be maintained and deepened, then it is not likely that the cross-border co-
operation could undermine the power of the nation-state. 
Consequently, if the EU and national actors have played and still play a major 
role in the co-operation, a top-down perspective may be the only force that 
determines the co-operation’s future. The power of the nation-state is then 
assumed to be scarcely affected. 
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2 Methodology 
This chapter firstly deals with questions about the selection of the specific case 
and secondly it draws attention to methodological considerations related to the 
thesis purpose to develop an analytical framework. Subsequently, the 
methodological chapter will complete with a discussion about the selection of data 
and interviewees. 
2.1 Case study and the selection of case 
In order to answer the overall research question two more operational research 
questions were carried out. These questions focus on a particular case since an 
intensive study of a single unit was considered as fruitful. Also due to a time limit 
and the fact that the evaluation is of a qualitative character it was considered to be 
appropriate to conduct a case study, consisting of only one case. 
Opposed to a survey, which collects a rather small amount of information on 
many different subjects, a case study “refers to research that investigates a few 
cases, often just one, in considerable depth” (Gomm 2000 p.3). It has been argued 
that the method of case study is “poorly understood” and a “synonym for free-
form research”, due to its loosely framed definition (Gerring 2007 p.6-8). 
Nevertheless case studies may be the most adapted method in cross-border co-
operation research, since it is particularly suitable for empirical investigations 
(Jørgensen 1998 p.52). 
Cases may vary extensively and generalisations may only be possible after a 
high number of case studies (Gomm 2000 p.3). Hence it would not be possible 
after one case study to draw any general conclusions whereas cross-border co-
operations strengthen or undermine the power of the nation-state. However, 
hopefully the case study at hand can contribute with one part to the whole 
research field. 
Since the thesis does not strive for any generalisations, the selection of case is 
not decisive. However the cross-border co-operation South Baltic is chosen due to 
a number of reasons. Firstly, the South Baltic cross-border co-operation is 
selected as a case since it was established in 2007 and therefore the process took 
time in adjacent time, which makes it easier to research. The interviewees most 
probably find it easier to remember processes that are not too far in the history. 
Secondly, the South Baltic co-operation is also an interesting case since it is one 
of the few cross-border co-operation crossing land-sea borders and which consist 
of entitles from both new and old European Member States. These kinds of cross-
border co-operations funded by Interreg had not existed before 2007 and are 
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therefore a new phenomenon which has not become any wider attention from 
other researchers. Consequently, this thesis seeks to provide new data about the 
conditions. Thirdly, how and to what extent different political levels may 
influence and determine the South Baltic co-operation’s opportunities to be 
maintained and deepened may also be most interesting when the co-operation is in 
progress, and when roles and structure are not completely clear. Fourth, the South 
Baltic is subject to a wide range of environmental problems. A shared problem 
and engagement for change at subnational level may be a solution to the 
environmental problems which the national states at this point have not solved. A 
final argument for the South Baltic co-operation as a selected case is the fact that 
five countries are involved. This implies that a wider range of perspectives can be 
collected from different interviewees. 
2.2 The method of Structure-Agency 
Due to the fact that the thesis has two operational research questions, it is 
necessary to focus on varied theoretical approaches in order to firstly study the 
establishment process and secondly examine how different actors can influence 
the co-operation’s opportunities to be maintained and deepened. Concerning the 
establishment process there are already theories that can be applied and which 
only partly need to be adjusted in order to fit the phenomena under study. The last 
research question is theoretically more demanding and hence it is necessary to 
develop an analytical framework. This section seeks to discuss considerations 
connected to the method of developing an analytical framework. 
The analytical framework developed is inspired by the structure-agency 
perspective. According to Giddens, who represents one of the foremost in the 
structure-agency debate, structures are seen as constrains of what the particular 
individuals or organisations can do. Furthermore he also writes about structures in 
terms of “rules and resources” and what enable particular actions (Stuart 2002 
p.279). 
Viewed from the position by Giddens the thesis’s structure perspective both 
deals with what structures constrain and enable. The structure perspective is 
considered to be similar to what the thesis calls the vertical dimension. This 
dimension draws attention to the cross-border co-operation’s power dependence 
upon the EU and the national governments and to the keenness of structural 
support which the co-operation is dependent upon. 
The vertical dimension is theoretical explained by ideal types. The ideal types 
are constructed in order to clarify; hallmarks of different cross-border co-
operations, what a maintaining and deepening of the co-operation actually would 
mean, how power dependence upon the EU and the national states varies in 
relation to the ideal types, and consequently how the power of the nation-state can 
be differently affected depending on the structure of the co-operation. They are 
named as issue network, policy network and policy community, where issue 
network is a loosely integrated co-operation and policy community has the closest 
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integrated structure of cross-border co-operation. The method of ideal types is 
advantageous since it refines differences and can be seen as a guide which enables 
analysis (Halvorsen 1992 p.132). However, ideal types are just an analytical 
instrument and will not be viewed as definite and real categories (Bergström et al 
2005 p.159). 
The fact that the ideal types can be seen as categories along a continuum 
makes it easier to characterise co-operations and demonstrates how the power 
dependence varies from one ideal type to another. Strictly speaking, the ideal 
types facilitate an explanation of what kind of cross-border co-operation the South 
Baltic co-operation is at present and which structure it is embedded in. 
Subsequently it can through the ideal types be shown how and to what extent the 
EU and the national governments can influence and determine the co-operation’s 
opportunities to be maintained and deepened. 
Proceeding to the next chapter, the agency perspective, the “horizontal 
dimension” as it is called in this thesis suggests a framework of how to examine 
the links between the counterparts within the cross-border co-operation and how 
unified they are. A methodological problem that arises when applying a structural-
agency perspective on a cross-border co-operation is the question of how to define 
the agency. In principal it could actually be the entire population within the cross-
border co-operation. However, this would create a too wide research area and 
therefore the agency will consist of representatives at subnational level. The 
representatives are either a member of the cross-border co-operation’s Steering 
Committee or Monitoring Committee, working in the cross border co-operation’s 
Joint Technical Secretariat or is a former participant in the establishment process. 
The agency will be examined from a similar agency-perspective defined by 
Hay, where the actors should have the ability or capacity to “act consciously, and 
in so doing, to attempt to realise his or her intentions” (Hay 2002 p.94). The 
ability and capacity is very essential for the subnational level in order to influence 
and determine its own co-operation’s opportunity to be maintained and deepened. 
When the horizontal dimension is not strong enough it can be assumed that the co-
operation’s future is decided by the vertical dimension, consisting of the EU and 
the national governments. In order to study the cross-border co-operation’s ability 
or capacity, it is presumed that the cross-border co-operation is dependent upon 
different factors. These factors are organised into three different themes; strategic 
unification and relation resources, knowledge and leadership resources, and 
mobilisation capacity, and is further explained in the chapter about the horizontal 
dimension. 
The core in the structure-agency debate relates to what type of relationship 
structure and agency ought to have. One view is that agency and structure are 
oppositional. A second view presented by Giddens is that they are “flip sides of 
the same coin”, indicating that we can alternate between the two but not view 
them simultaneously (ibid p.95, 120). The third and the most fruitful view for the 
purpose of the thesis is the one represented by the theorists Jessop (1996) and Hay 
(2002). Hay suggests that “the potential utility of seeking to combine the analysis 
of structure and agency and of recognising the complex interplay between the two 
in any given situation” (Hay 2002 p.101). Also Badersten remarks the interplay 
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where on the one hand the agent’s intentions, motivation and variations in the 
degree of discretion play a key role but where on the other side the structure 
constitute the framework of the acting (Badersten 2002 p.78). In line with Hay, 
Jessop and Badersten cross-border co-operations are considered as a complex 
interplay between the structure (the EU and the national governments) and the 
agency (the subnational actors). Consequently, both the structure and the agency 
must be taken into account simultaneously in order to study which hands cross-
border co-operations actually lies in. 
2.3 Selection of Data and Interviewees 
The theory employed for the second research question concerning the 
establishment process is to a greater part inspired by John W Kingdon and his 
revised model of how to understand decision-making processes in multi-level 
structures. In contrast; the developed analytical framework, related to the third 
research question concerning how different actors can influence and determine the 
cross-border co-operation’s opportunities to be maintained or deepened, is based 
on different theoretical strands. The literature about cross-border co-operations 
cannot be seen as a composed theoretical approach, due to the many perspectives 
that exist. Therefore, it has been essential to select the approaches suitable for the 
thesis’ research questions and also supplement with previous research from; 
policy analyses, organisational theory and democratic theories. Thus the theories 
are further considered in the subsequent chapters this section pays rather attention 
to the methodology considerations regarding the empirical work. 
In order to answer the two operational questions the empirical work must have 
two viewpoints. Firstly, insight is required in how the establishment process 
proceeded and secondly it is necessary to have awareness of different actors’ 
attitudes to the co-operation. 
The first viewpoint was in part researchable through homepages, documents 
and minutes. However, it was necessary to obtain additional information from 
what Flick calls “expert interviews”. The expert interviews are useful when 
insights are required in a certain field of activity, which the expert represents 
(Flick 2006 p.165). Moreover, these kinds of interviews generally require that the 
interviewer holds good pre-knowledge in the field (Kvale 1996 p.101), where 
perusal of; homepages, documents and minutes played a central role. When using 
the method of expert interviews, different interview objects contribute to different 
knowledge and there is hence no reason to ask the same questions to the 
interviewees (Esaiasson et al 2004 p.254). Different question batteries were 
therefore written to all interviewees. 
To the second viewpoint about different actors’ attitudes to the co-operation, 
respondent interviews were applied. Respondent interviews are characterised by 
the interviewees’ thoughts being the object of study (Esaiasson et al 2004 p.254).) 
An advantage that follows is that both the expert interviews and the respondent 
interviews can be conducted in a semi-structured style. This made it possible to 
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combine them and conduct them at the same time, since several interviewees had 
a function as both an expert and as a respondent. The hallmark of semi-structured 
interviews is that they consist of a sequence of themes, as well as suggested 
questions. This contributes to an openness to follow up the answers given (Kvale 
1996 p.124, Flick 2006 p.165) 
The interview questions were based on the written theory and the developed 
analytical framework. Another reason for having different question batteries to 
different actors, except the reason that expert interviews require it, is derived from 
the fact that it is only the subnational actors who should have a say concerning the 
horizontal dimension. National actors and the representatives from the EU 
commission instead played a greater role when it came to understand the vertical 
dimension. Moreover, different actors have been involved at various times in the 
co-operation and they have or did have different functions. Some were involved in 
the establishment process and others knew more about present conditions. 
Consequently, all these reasons resulted in the need to have different questions 
battery, even if some questions could be used for all. 
Most of the interviews took place in the interviewees’ working places, where 
the interview objects probably felt most comfortable. Compared to telephone 
interviews, meeting the people involved in the co-operation hopefully resulted in a 
more trustful relationship, where the interviews felt freer to speak. The interviews 
were also conducted in the interviewees’ native language (English, German or 
Swedish) apart from stakeholders from Poland, where poor polish language skills 
forced me to conduct the interviews in English. 
So how were the interviewees selected? The process of choosing interview 
objects can be similar to the initial phase of the method of process-tracing. The 
first step in process-tracing is namely to identify actors who are relevant 
(Esaiasson et al 2004 p.142). This is often a detective work, where no simple 
method can be applied (Gerring 2007 p.172-185). Gerring’s comment on that it is 
not always simple to find interview objects, turned out be true as it took a great 
deal of time to find the right interview objects. However, a combination of 
participant lists from different meetings since 2006, minutes and the so-called 
famous snowball effect, contributed to the selected interviewees. 
Due to the aim of conducting both expert interviews and respondent 
interviews often in combination with each other, a special selection was vital. For 
the expert interviews, who mostly are related to the research question concerning 
the establishment process it was important that the interviewees had the unique 
information requested. In order to be an expert a good deal of experience is an 
initial requirement. Here it turned out that just three representatives have been 
involved in the co-operation since its beginning. It was therefore very crucial to 
interview these actors; Niels Cresten Andersen (Denmark), Ulf Savbäck (Sweden) 
and Slawomir Demkowicz – Dobrzanski (Poland). In addition, another expert who 
was important for the understanding was identified, Wiktor Szydarowski (the 
author of the Operational Programme). Carina Johnsson (Sweden), Håkan 
Brynelsson (Sweden), Karl Schmude (Germany) and Andreas Schubert 
(Germany) can also partly be seen as experts since they were involved in the co-
operation from the beginning and took part in the establishment process. The head 
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of the Joint Technical Secretariat (Martha Plichta) responsible for the daily 
management of the co-operation was selected for a combination of an expert and 
respondent interview. 
Two criteria constituted the selection of the respondent interviewees in order 
to examine both the vertical and horizontal dimension. Firstly, that they 
represented different political levels (the EU, the national governments and the 
subnations). Secondly, that they represented different countries. Due to time 
constraints it was not possible to visit all five countries; therefore most 
information was obtained from three countries, as well from representatives from 
the European Commission. Firstly, Poland was selected because they are 
responsible for the Managing Authority of the co-operation. Secondly, Sweden, 
since they took the initiative for the co-operation within the framework of 
Interreg. Finally, Germany was selected because of their early doubtfulness and 
their late decision to join the co-operation. However, the Danish view was given 
through Niels Christen Andersen via a telephone interview and Lithuania’s view 
was obtained through E-Mail correspondence. Altogether, fourteen face to face 
interviews were carried out; three telephone interviews and one questionnaire. 
The interviews lasted 1.5 hour on average and all of them have been transcribed. 
A list of interviewees is attached in Appendix 1. 
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3 How to understand decision-making 
processes in multilevel-structures 
To understand decision-making processes several theoretical approaches have in 
earlier research been applied. According to Kingdon, three approaches are more 
common than others; rational decision-making, incrementalism and the garbage 
can model. In order to shed light on the establishment process of the South Baltic 
co-operation and what role different actors played, the garbage can model carries 
more relevance. 
A rational decision-making model often includes a top-down perspective 
where goals first are defined, then alternatives of solutions are compared and 
finally the best alternative at least cost is chosen. However, it is not always the 
reality that processes follow a regular pattern (Kingdon 2003 p.71, 78). A rational 
decision-making model is also very difficult to achieve when there are multiple 
actors (Hill 2002 p.44), which was the case during the establishment process of 
the South Baltic co-operation.  
Even the approach of incrementalism is insufficient when intending to 
understand the South Baltic co-operation’s establishment process. Incrementalism 
focuses on small gradual policy changes. It is therefore not applicable when new 
co-operations are established which do not follow from earlier decisions (Kingdon 
2003 p.80). Consequently, the garbage can model remains important and will be 
presented here and partly adjusted in order to fit the phenomena under study.  
3.1 The garbage can model 
The garbage can model was originally developed by Michael D. Cohen, James 
March and Johan Olsen in 1972. However, new features have been added since 
then. Kingdon, one of the foremost in the debate has for example contributed with 
a revised model for a wider understanding of processes. His model that in addition 
to the term “garbage can” also includes the terms “policy windows” and “policy 
entrepreneurs” is the most suitable for the thesis’s purpose and is therefore 
primarily used. 
To understand a decision-making process, or like in this case to understand the 
establishment process of the South Baltic cross-border co-operation, it is 
according to the garbage can model essential to study policy streams and the so 
called mix of garbage. The policy streams within the garbage can consist of; 
problems, solutions, participants and participants’ resources. These policy streams 
operate largely independent of one another. For example solutions are developed 
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whether or not there is a problem. People may also generate solutions due to self-
interest, for instance in order to keep their job or to expand their unit. 
Furthermore, policy streams often come from different origins and may also 
suddenly change or develop after new situations facing the people involved in the 
decision-making process (ibid p.84-88). To use March and Olsen’s words 
decision-making processes are often ‘organized anarchies’. ‘Collection of choices 
looking for problems, issues and feelings looking for decision situations in which 
they might be aired, solutions looking for issues to which they might be the 
answer, and decision makers looking for work’ (cited in ibid. p.85). 
What later determines the outcome of a decision is how different policy 
streams are processed and joined. Who the participants are at a given time may for 
example matter. The outcome can dramatically be affected by who is invited or 
shows up for a meeting. Likewise, the solutions which are ready for airing and 
which problems are on people’s minds are critical. In addition participant’s 
resources may also play an essential role for the outcome. 
In sum, a study of the process must consider two things. Firstly, the flow of 
separate policy streams through the system. Secondly, the coupling of the streams 
(Kingdon 2003 p.84-88). In the South Baltic case, it is possible to separate 
streams that came from the EU, national actors and from subnational actors. 
Consequently, when comparing the original streams with the real outcome it will 
be clear how different actors have influenced and determined the outcome. 
3.2 Policy Windows 
As indicated above, decisions are made when different policy streams (problems, 
solutions, participants and the participants’ resources) are coupling. For example a 
problem is recognised, a solution is developed and available, and the political 
climate allows a change. But how and when do the policy streams come together? 
According to Kingdon, the policy streams are joining most likely at critical 
times when a window opens and presents the opportunity for a launch. A window 
opens and closes for a variety of reasons. It can for instance open when a public 
opinion wants a change, when a new legislation comes to force or simply when an 
administration is changed (Kingdon 2003 p.168). Another reason that policy 
windows open can be due to a spillover effect. The fact that a window open for 
one subject can often increase the probability that a window will open for another 
similar subject. Politicians or civil servants may for example see an attractive 
agreement in one adjacent issue area and then attempt to transfer the same 
agreement into similar situations (ibid p.190-192). In the same way a window also 
closes for a couple reasons. For instance, it happens when participants already 
have addressed solutions and still fail to act. People may then be unwilling to 
invest further time, energy or political capital. Furthermore, the event or reason 
that made the window open may also pass from the scene (ibid p.169).  
Consequently, a window may not be open for a very long time and can close 
quite suddenly. If the right policy streams do not come together and if the 
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participants do not take advantage of the opportunity that is served at the critical 
time when the window is open, they must wait until the next opportunity arise. 
Due to this, one could understand that quick action is required. Proposal that have 
been worked out beforehand have a better chance to be breezed through, even if a 
new proposal may also rise to the surface and be equally suitable. Kingdon notes 
that; since participants know that the window soon will be closed really big steps 
are often taken very quickly or not at all. This creates a tendency of people having 
second thoughts about policies that are launched since they often are rushed in 
order to not let opportunities pass (ibid p.170). 
3.3 Policy Entrepreneurs 
Up to this point it has been argued that the outcome of a decision depends upon 
when the policy streams are coupling and mutually when a policy window opens. 
It has also been noted that policy streams that already have started to couple 
before the window opens easier leads to a final decision, even though strong 
single factors may change the track after the window has opened. What has not 
been explained so far is; what makes the coupling of the policy streams, both 
before as well as after the window has opens? 
When the window is open opportunities for change increase but someone must 
actively couple the policy streams. There must be some who are willing to invest 
their resources in terms of time, energy, reputation and money in order to push 
through a decision. These people that have the willingness to invest their 
resources and the belief that the issue are going to be productive are by Kingdon 
called policy entrepreneurs. Policy entrepreneurs must not necessarily be the 
origin of the idea; rather they are the ones that push so an idea becomes the final 
decision. Ideas do often have several origins and the most important is hence not 
to understand were they come from but who and what made them take hold and 
grow (Kingdon 2003 p.72, 179). 
Policy entrepreneurs are the ones that soften up the systems and enable the 
coupling of the policy streams. However, to do so some qualities are required for 
success. Firstly, the policy entrepreneurs must have a wide expertise. That is to 
say, he or she must have knowledge about the special conditions, an ability to 
speak for others and have good negotiations skills. Secondly, the person must also 
have some form of political connection. A higher authoritative decision-making 
position creates much more influence. Finally, the quality that probably is most 
crucial is persistence but evidently in combination with the other qualities 
mentioned. Persistence implies, as also already mentioned a willingness to 
sometimes invest remarkable quantities of time, energy and other resources (ibid 
p.179-180). 
One can nearly always pinpoint policy entrepreneurs or key persons in a 
decision-making process. The establishment process of the South Baltic co-
operation is probably no exception. However, most interesting is to examine 
which level this or those key persons represent: the EU, the nation states or the 
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subnations as there would be a considerable difference depending on who is the 
driving force. 
According to several earlier case studies (see for example Perkmann 1999, 
Church & Reid 1999, Beck 1997) it has been found that when subnational actors 
have been the driving force, cross-border co-operation can jointly work more 
independently from the central authorities, implement their political goals and in 
some sense also challenge and undermine the power of the nation-state. Higher 
success is also expected in cases where local authorities and regions tend to be the 
driving force and where the policy entrepreneurs represent the subnational level. 
They often then see cross-border co-operation as a part of a strategy as 
“entrepreneurial regions/cities”. 
In contrast, when it turns out that actors from the national governments have 
been the driving force, the cross-border co-operation mostly cannot be seen as it 
hollows out the nation-state. The cross-border co-operation may then in a higher 
degree depend on national states politics. They may be employed in the context of 
more general policy objectives, which means that the cross-border co-operation’s 
discretion to a large extent lies in the hands of the central authorities (Perkmann 
1999 p.662-663). 
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4 The vertical dimension 
In order to shed light on a cross-border co-operation and be able to identify 
different actors’ influence of the co-operation’s opportunities to be maintained or 
deepened; it is initially central to understand the multilevel structure that the co-
operation is embedded in. In this chapter a vertical dimension will be discussed, 
which contextualises the cross-border co-operations’ relations with the EU and the 
different participating states. Through the creation of ideal types this relationship 
can be conceptualised and constitute a framework of how to understand cross-
boarder co-operations’ power dependence. It is essential to understand the power 
dependence in order to examine the influence of the EU and the national 
governments and what discretion subnational actors have for maintaining or 
deepening their co-operation (Östhol 1996 p.32). The degree of influence from the 
EU and the participating states can accordingly affect a strengthening or 
undermining of the nation-state. If a cross-border co-operation is highly 
dependent on the national level and national states control the cross-border co-
operation the co-operation will most likely not undermine the nation-state. 
After the vertical structure is described, it is from given circumstances 
possible to study cross-border co-operations’ opportunities to be maintained or 
deepened from an agency related aspect. This means that this chapter sets out the 
structure cross-border co-operations act in, so the next chapter through a 
horizontal dimension can focus on the links between the counterparts within a 
cross-border co-operation and what capacity they themselves have to maintain or 
deepen their co-operation. 
4.1 Ideal types and power dependence 
Ideal types have in different constructions frequently been composed and applied 
in research related to cross-border co-operations (see for example Jørgensen 1998, 
Hall et al 2005 and Jordan 2006). The three ideal types constructed for this 
thesis’s purpose should like previous research not be seen as definitive categories. 
Rather they will work as a tool; to clarify different forms of cross-border co-
operations, to understand how power dependence upon the EU and the national 
states vary depending on the co-operation form and consequently how the power 
of the national governments can be differently affected. The ideal types are also 
useful in demonstrating what factors are required for the co-operation either to be 
maintained or deepened. 
The three constructed ideal types for this thesis are entitled, issue network, 
policy network and policy community, and can after inspiration from Jørgensen 
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(1998) and Rhodes (1997) be seen as categories along a continuum. The issue 
network is the most loose co-operation form and the policy community has the 
tightest integrated structure of cross-border co-operation. 
The ideal types and the different degree of power dependence for each ideal 
type are also illustrated in a figure on page 19. 
4.1.1 Issue network 
The first ideal type, issue network, has a hallmark of a fluctuating membership 
which is open to all potential partners across the borders (Jørgensen 1998 p.29-
30). Due to its open membership character there is no clear territorial delimitation 
(Hall et al 2005 p.76-79). Also, because of its open membership, contacts and 
continuity will vary in frequency and intensity. The co-operation is mostly on an 
informal basis and has no generally established common agenda of interests and 
visions. Rather issue network is driven from subject and takes place in different 
times (Rhodes 1997 p.44, Jordan 2006 p.24). 
This type of co-operation is beyond any forms of institutionalisation, and is 
therefore merely dependent on individual actors or groups in the society that 
search for partners and build networks across the borders (Paasi 1986 p.34-35). 
Due to the issue network’s low degree of institutionalisation, a support from the 
EU and the national states do not determine its existence. The issue network 
constructed here as an ideal type is not financial sponsored from either the EU or 
the national states. The effect of this is that the co-operation is not subject to any 
hierarchical regulation or obligations to the central governments. Additionally, 
because of its loosely integrated co-operational structure it is not contingent upon 
any organisational resources, which constitute the daily management of cross-
border activities (Jørgensen 1998 p.29-34). The low degree of power dependence 
upon the EU and the national governments also implies that no reinforcement for 
the specific co-operation is required. 
Nevertheless, a low degree of power dependence on the EU and the national 
states does not obviously result in more operational discretion. The fact that issue 
networks are not sponsored with any external financial recourses constrain the 
cross-border co-operation’s opportunities to deepen their integration. This is 
particularly noticeable for cross-border co-operations which represent entities 
from different countries with diverged prosperities and where some in the network 
have resources and others do not (ibid p.29). This principally implies 
complications in the search of common co-operation areas and projects that bring 
mutual advantages. Consequently, issue networks are often restricted to merely 
exchange information and knowledge, and where pooling resources are less 
common. However, exchanges of information and knowledge have several 
advantages for both developed and undeveloped economies. An example can be 
given from the environmental field. Many regional undeveloped economies have 
for instance not developed a domestic “eco-industry”, and contacts with 
developed regions can therefore generate a wider engagement into environmental 
protection. At the same time the developed regions can strengthen their eco-
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industry and make economical profits. Further activities that can be held in the 
form of issue networks are when people co-operate and work through common 
power across the borders. They may for example have the purpose of influencing 
and pressurising the different national governments to take responsibility for 
acting and finding solutions for a problem that has been identified in the region 
(Baker 1996 p.27-31). Finally, due to the loose form of co-operation and since the 
activities mostly consist of exchanging information and knowledge the power of 
the national governments could barely be affected. 
4.1.2 Policy network 
As demonstrated above, issue networks are not contingent upon an array of 
factors, besides engaged individual actors who initiate the co-operation. Issue 
networks have therefore been considered as the first stage in a co-operation 
process and numerous problems are often not surfaced during this phase (Haveri 
2008 p.149). In the next step, named policy network, more compromises are 
required, which later will be deeper clarified in the discussion regarding the 
horizontal dimension. Also an increased power dependence upon the EU and the 
national states emerge within a policy network compared to an issue network. 
This relationship is in discussed this section, in terms of how the participation 
from the EU and the national states both enables and constraints the policy 
network. 
The policy network is characterised by a more limited membership and a 
clearer territorial delimitation compared to an issue network. Furthermore, a 
policy network is deeper formalised and contacts and interactions take place on a 
regular basis. Its visions for the co-operation are constricted and contracted to 
some agreed policy areas (Jørgensen 1998 p.29-30). Most policy networks have a 
long-term co-operation aim even if their stability is contingent upon several 
factors (Östhol 1996 p.38). 
A policy network across borders is often an outcome of complex interaction 
between the EU, the national states and the population within the cross-border 
region (O’Dowd 2002 p.112). This implies another sense of power dependence 
upon the EU and national states than what for example was the case with issue 
networks. The power dependence within a policy network lies mutually on a 
financial, decisional and legal bias. 
To begin with, the financial support which policy networks receive from either 
the EU or the national governments provide opportunities to deepen their co-
operation from mainly ceremonial interaction towards realisation of concrete 
projects (Perkmann 1999 p.662). The financial resources also enable an 
establishment of a co-ordinated organisation, which are responsible for the daily 
management of cross-border activities. The staff in these Joint Secretariats, can in 
another sense match counter partners, and with special skills supply the counter 
partners with advice for successful integration (Jørgensen 1998 p.34). The 
external financial resources do also give birth to realise projects that do not result 
in actual mutual advantages between the counter partners, so far as they do not 
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bring any disadvantages for some of the stakeholders. The mutual dependence 
between the counter parts can therefore be described as common aspiration for 
external resources albeit they are allocated unequally (Östhol 1996 p.39). 
Even if, the financial resources bring opportunities they also constrains the 
discretion. Due to many actors involvement in the co-operation, the process of 
defining the agenda needs to consider many preferences, which often are not 
compatible (ibid p.38). Subnational actors have no decisive power, which implies 
that it is only possible to co-operate in issues that are approved by the EU and the 
national parliaments (Hall et al 2005 p.72). Another problem, caused by the 
involvement of several political levels is that the co-operation needs to follow all 
countries legislations which sometimes are fundamentally different and in 
substantial contradiction to each other. In addition they must also follow the EU’s 
regulations written specific for cross-border co-operation. This furthermore can 
result in constrains for important common projects and actions (Jørgensen 1998 
p.32) 
At last, what are then the key activities for a policy network? As mentioned 
previously, a policy network brings possibilities to realise different kinds of 
concrete projects. When resources are shifted from national level to regional level, 
projects can be designed for those who have the insight in the regions need. On 
the other hand, projects can also contribute to essential solutions and improvement 
that are valuable for the national states as a whole. The financial support may 
further enable undeveloped regions, which find themselves with administrative 
incapacities, in terms of untrained staff, missing knowledge and facilities, 
possibilities in the form of assistance from more developed countries. 
Consequently, this could for example in the environmental field mean that some 
countries have useful skills or data collection, which can help others to fully 
implement the EU’s environmental protection policy (Barker 1996 p.28-31). 
However, policy networks have not the possibility to implement any policies, 
since they are not an executive authority (Hall et al 2005 p.72). This in 
combination with national actors’ involvement implies that the power of the 
nation-state can just marginally be affected. 
4.1.3 Policy community 
The policy community is the closest form of co-operation and the only co-
operation structure that really can undermine the power of the national 
governments within the co-operation area. A policy community is territorially 
delimited with restricted membership, and its common interest and value-system, 
is not only limited to specific policy areas. Interaction takes place frequently, and 
in comparison to policy network all members are always involved in decision-
making processes, including defining the agenda. The most explicit difference 
compared to the policy network is that all members have their own resources, 
which give less or at least another form of power dependent upon the EU and the 
national governments (Rhodes 1997 p.43-44). The financial resources can be 
imposed by taxes on their citizens earmarked for cross-border activities. However, 
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it can be very difficult to set aside resources due to the central regulations the 
cross-border co-operation needs to follow. Although, policy communities are 
characterised by that they receive financial resources but have less detailed 
regulations about how to use them (Jørgensen 1998 p.32-33). 
The cross-border co-operation’s organisation is not merely made up of a 
consulting and coordinated art; it also has the power to make priorities and 
decisions and furthermore execute either its or national politics (Hall et al 2005 
p.76-79). Legally, the cross-border co-operation has a constitutional framework 
which to a different extent regulates the co-operation and gives it the necessary 
competence to carry out common tasks (Jørgensen 1998 p.34). 
Accordingly, policy community has more autonomy and is in some sense less 
dependent on the EU and national governments. However, this level of co-
operation is very difficult to reach from both the vertical but also from the 
horizontal point of view. Firstly a policy community implies that the cross-border 
region is heavily united and that all criteria outlined in the chapter about the 
horizontal dimension are met. Secondly, the national governments must be willing 
to give up some power to the regional level, which they are not always too 
enthusiastic about. Experience shows that in many cases where subnations have 
tried to exert more autonomy from their national states their attempts have mostly 
failed, or their success is due to a very strong engagement from the subnational 
level in order to be a policy community. 
Despite the difference to establish a policy community it can be argued that 
this ideal type is the most advantageous since it brings the cross-border co-
operation more opportunity to deal with local issues. By contrast to policy 
networks; policy community can in addition to realising projects also create 
common policies and implement them, which according to Marshall have a higher 
value than single developmental projects funded by the EU (Marshall 1997 
p.195). 
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5 The horizontal dimension 
The vertical dimension outlined the structure which cross-border co-operations 
are embedded in, but cross-border co-operations are not only a top-down project, 
regulated from the EU and the national governments. In order to function 
effectively and for durable success there also needs to be a bottom-up 
involvement, where the co-operation actually is promoted by subnational actors 
(Baker 1997 p.23). In this chapter focus will be on the agency, which in this case 
is equal to subnational actors within the co-operation. The chapter seeks to outline 
a framework of how to evaluate the South Baltic programme’s opportunities for 
maintaining and deepening from an agency perspective.  
The factors that a cross-border co-operation on a horizontal level are 
dependent on is among others inspired by Healey et al (2003) and will be 
presented from three different themes. The themes are entitled; strategic 
unification and relation resources, knowledge and leadership resources, and 
mobilisation capacity. The framework below is also illustrated on page 20. 
5.1 Strategic unification and relation resources 
Crucial for a cross-border co-operation’s opportunities to be maintained or 
deepened is that actors can see some kind of advantages with the co-operation, 
that is to say; recognise strategic reasons for unification, and feel some form of 
belonging. An issue network can survive without a strong feeling of belonging 
whereas a policy community would probably not be possible to be maintained 
without this feeling. 
To begin with, there are some technical factors that can contribute to the 
feeling of belonging. An appropriate size of the population is the first technical 
factor, meaning that if there are many participants the cost of information 
exchange and of monitoring are consequently going to be higher. Furthermore, the 
larger and more varied the population, the greater is the likelihood for value 
differences, which can constrain the co-operation and the feeling of belonging 
(Jordan 2006 p.36). Another technical factor includes the natural properties of the 
cross-border region. A geographical region such as a common river basin may 
offer an area for economic and social planning, which can enhance the strategic 
unification (Jørgensen 1998 p.24). Due to an issue network has a fluctuating 
membership and no territorial delimitation these two first factors are only valid for 
a policy network and a policy community. An additional requirement, which also 
in some sense can be regarded as technical is the economies of scale. This 
approach is associated with the tradition of neoclassical economics, and captures 
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economic transaction, commuting, shopping and other economic linkages. If the 
cross-border co-operation bears presently and historically tighter economical 
relations, a deeper co-operation in form of a policy community is more likely to 
expand (Perkmann et al 2002 p.7-8). If economic exchange to a high degree is 
absent, this can consequently operate as a barrier for a successful closer co-
operation (Lersche et al 2002 p.77). The economies of scale are although very 
difficult to evaluate since it would require correct measurement of output, which 
should contain both qualitative and quantitative indicators. However, the 
economies of scale are not determined for durable co-operation. There can also be 
other reasons for maintaining a co-operation, where for instance environmental 
protection can constitute one example. 
Most importantly, to maintain and deepen all kind of co-operations’ structure 
is that the subnational actors act as a unit and that they have a shared vision of 
guidelines for action and intervention (Perkmann 2007 p.262). This often includes 
a common interest, a shared problem and an inclination to work towards common 
solutions (Scott 1999 p.607, Healey et al 2003 p.77). The greater the sizes of 
problems or potential benefits, the more interested are actors often to work 
towards solutions (Jessop 2002 p.39). The thinkable difficulties that can arise 
within a cross-border co-operation would be if participants own territorial 
interests that would determine the outcome rather than if representatives would 
act in the common interest of the cross-border co-operation (Hall et all 2005 
p.135, Perkmann 2002 p.109). To avoid the problem of too self-centred actors it is 
essential that all partners can draw benefits but also make concessions (Johansson 
2002 p.12). In addition, if there is a lack of common visions and interests the co-
operation tends to be of ad-hoc character. Many of these cross-border co-
operations with no initial defined ambitions are often later questioned by 
increasing doubts regarding their effectiveness and if they contribute to any 
improvements (Perkmann 2002 p.109). 
Furthermore, a wide range of researchers of cross-border co-operation have 
stressed a common identity as a central factor for durable co-operation across the 
borders. Nevertheless, there are authors that argue that a common identity is not 
necessary in order to establish good co-operation. For instance it has been claimed 
that modern societies have become culturally more complex and that problem 
solving requires co-operation between different groups that do not necessarily 
share the same language (Hajer 2003 p.10). Furthermore it has been claimed that 
we nowadays have a lower degree of shared identity with our compatriots and less 
stable local units than we once did (Innes et al 2003 p. 35). Deriving from this, in 
compliance with relatively unified researchers and from the ideal types, a 
common identity can not be seen as a requirement for maintaining a policy 
network. However, a policy community with a tighter co-operation structure a 
more common identity it to prefer but not required. 
As indicated, an achievement of a common identity is an ambitious target. 
Nevertheless, it is not impossible to build identities across borders even if it is 
difficult and takes time. Identities are namely multiplied, which means that people 
can have more than one identity and they are also changeable. National borders 
can be seen as socially constructed where neither relations nor identities are static 
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(Stubbergaard 2007 p.250). It has been stated that construction of the meaning of 
communities and their boundaries occurs through narratives. Stories give people 
common experiences, history and memories binds people together. Even culture, 
politics, economics, administration and education can constitute narratives which 
the new established cross-border co-operations that want a common identity must 
consider. Furthermore, identities are often described in terms of a difference 
between us and the others, rather than focus on the certain group of people (Paasi 
2002 p.75-81). 
Another important horizontal factor for a sustainable co-operation is cultural 
and institutional similarities. Since policy networks and also policy communities 
in most cases do not have any instrumental character, featured of a hierarchical 
system; they are even more contingent on institutional attributes. Institutional 
attributes are however evolving only as the co-operation has been in process for a 
while. It has then become a value-bearing organisation with its own identity and 
has its own view of what the essential problems are and which solution they 
require (Christensen et al 2005 p.13-16). As mentioned it takes time to reach an 
institutional level, and in fact many cross-border co-operations never turn out to 
be institutionalised (Hall et al 2005 p.72). However, the starting situation is very 
essential. If the countries involved compose a too wide institutional diversity and 
no shared vision, the cross-border co-operation will probably to a higher degree 
confront problems with efficiency and collective responsibility-taking. 
Furthermore, predominated cultural differences can also result in 
misunderstanding and frictions in the co-operation (Jerneck 2007 p.227). It is also 
claimed that co-operations that consist of a homogenous group may actually co-
ordinate themselves better than a heterogeneous group (Jordan 2006 p37). 
Consequently, since cross-border co-operations mostly have no instrumental 
character, some kind of institutional similarities are not only good but also 
desirable. However, during the development of institutional attributes and a 
common identity the cross-border co-operation is encouraged to utilize the 
institutional and cultural heterogeneousness. By doing so, the heterogeneousness 
can in some sense contribute to a higher degree of flexibility, increased 
competence and skills to handle a complexity of diverse considerations 
(Christensen et al 2005 p.59). 
In sum, a common identity, cultural and institutional similarities are important 
even if is arguable to which extent. However, an understanding between all of the 
participants as well as a mutual trust is something that always is essential for an 
issue network as well as a policy community. The origins of trust can arise from a 
variety of things. Common values can play a vital role but also past strategies 
imply mutual trust. Past strategies in terms of earlier experience of co-operations 
and the feedback from previous choices, may result in trust and a durable co-
operation (Jordan 2006 p.16, 37). Even the numbers of relations which already 
exist and are linked across the borders, also referred as “the thickness or 
integration of network”, have a high significance for understanding and trust. The 
relation resources and the mutual trust are furthermore often personalised, which 
means that there often are some important key persons in a cross-border co-
operation. These relations between the key persons across the borders have an 
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extensive impact of the co-operation climate as a whole. For instance, it is 
important that there is an absence of complaining about the behaviour of 
particular participants and the authorities involved in the cross-border co-
operation. A shift of people in leading positions can also jeopardize the networks 
and the co-operation’s duration, since networks often rely on personalised trust. 
When people often are exchanged a co-operation’s long-term development goals 
can be treated (Healey et al 2003 p.75-78).  
5.2 Common knowledge resources and leadership  
As indicated above a shared vision and interest are essential for a cross-border co-
operation. This shared vision is often derived from a coherent view and from 
common sources about “the place and its problems”, which can be called common 
knowledge resources (Healey et al 2003 p.79). In order to maintain a cross-border 
co-operation a capital of common knowledge resources is necessary, which 
consist of an array of explicit, tacit, systemised and experimental knowledge. 
When different stakeholders have diverse frames of references, when they focus 
their analysis and understanding on different issues and have competing priorities 
there is consequently per definition a lack of common knowledge resources. This 
lack of common knowledge is of course most serious if the co-operation is 
structured as a policy community but even an issue network may gain to have an 
adequate level of common knowledge resources. A sufficient capital of common 
knowledge resources primarily captures three criteria. Issue network should at 
least fulfil the first criterion listed below, a policy network at least the first and the 
second criteria and a policy community should meet all criteria. 
The first criterion consists of an openness which means that all participants 
should have access to available information about problems and solutions (ibid. 
p.65, 79-80). A second criterion of knowledge resources is that within the co-
operation it should be possible to absorb new ideas and learn from each other. If a 
co-operation promotes a learning experience, the actors will achieve the ability to 
develop a wider perspective and use viewpoints they have never used before, 
which will lead to a stronger and more successful cross-border co-operation. In 
order to learn, it is important that the decision-making process is not only top-
down controlled. For instance it is vital that the participants do not feel that a core 
of members have set the agenda in advance (ibid. p.80). The third criterion for a 
high extent of knowledge resources, relates to the second, and implies that 
knowledge is better accepted and applicable if it has different origins and when 
counter-parts have similar skills and provide knowledge of analogues manner 
(Jerneck 2007 p.231-232). 
In order to maximise the utilisation of the knowledge resources some form of 
leadership is beneficial at least for a policy network and a policy community. As 
previous noted cross-border co-operations are not of an instrumental character 
with a traditional hierarchical system and must therefore rely on informal 
leadership. The informal leadership can have different approaches and be 
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diversely exercised (Christensen et al 2005 p.65). However, it could be expected 
that in a tighter form of co-operation the co-ordinated organisation in the cross-
border co-operation should perform some form of leadership, rather than the 
actors at national level. Likewise, a tighter co-operation should also have 
individual key persons at subnational level that can perform the leadership. 
Through the knowledge resources which the leader has access to, the leader can 
specify the direction of the co-operation, keep the co-operation on track, act in 
finding compromises and mobilise power. Furthermore, it has also been argued 
that a subnational leadership within a cross-border co-operation in some sense 
should challenge and problematise the concept of the national state (Jerneck 2007 
p.236). 
Another perspective regarding leadership is that it neither has to be performed 
from the co-ordinated organisation nor by individual key persons within the cross-
border region. Rather it is argued that the European Commission plays an 
essential role in being the leader, accompanied with that both countries and 
regions often are too unsure about their own preferences and lack the capacity to 
find mutually acceptable agreements (Moravcsik 1999 p.269-270 and Beach 2004 
p.410-412). In a policy network with less independency this could be the 
accepted, but in a policy community it can be required that the cross-border co-
operation should manage its own leadership. 
5.3 Mobilisation capacity 
Related to the previously presented themes, mobilisation capacity from below also 
play an important role for subnational actor’s opportunities to maintain and 
deepen their co-operation. Particularly important would this be if it is shown that 
the EU-commission or the national states have the required leadership. Without an 
internal mobilisation capacity the maintaining and deepening of the co-operation 
will heavily depend on the EU’s ambitions or the national states’ politics. The 
term mobilisation capacity refers to three forms of mobilisations; politicians’ 
support, officers’ enthusiasm and public support. 
Politicians’ support is acknowledged to underpin the cross-border co-
operation’s opportunities to maintain over time (Perkmann 2007 p.257-258). 
Particularly important are the politician’s support for a policy network or a policy 
community since these principally must be recognised and approved by local 
politicians. A policy community that to a higher extent decide on its own public 
resources must also arguably consider democratic representation where it is 
possible to define the ones who are responsible (Hall et all 2005 p.74-75). If there 
is no democratic representation politician’s support is assumed to be lower, since 
the politicians then have less control. In contrast, another perspective claims that 
we are in a democratic paradigm between an old model of democratic 
representation and a new model of multi-level democracy. This implies that cross-
border co-operations do not have to claim their legitimacy through democratic 
representation. Rather cross-border co-operation’s political mobilisation and 
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political support derives from the ability to handle social conflicts. Viewed from 
this perspective the capacity to make quick decisions is ranked as more important, 
than other competitive values as democracy (Jerneck et al 2001 p.16, Jerneck 
2007 p.243). To conclude the discussion about political representation contra the 
ability to efficiently handle conflicts and make decisions, this thesis does not seek 
to take position in the debate. Rather, both political representation and the ability 
to efficiently handle problems will be considered as important values of 
mobilisation capacity and for subnational actors’ opportunity to maintain and 
deepen their co-operation. However, how efficient problems are handled should 
and cannot in the framework of this thesis be evaluated, therefore the main focus 
will be to the extent politicians are involved and political representation. 
Secondly, officers’ enthusiasm is probably most essential in terms of 
mobilisation capacity. Politicians’ support is crucial but it is often the civil 
servants in the case of a policy network and a policy community that execute the 
work and the ones involved in the cross-border co-operation. Their interest and 
enthusiasm determine the cross-border co-operation’s opportunities to be 
maintained and deepened. Furthermore, officers’ enthusiasm depends on an array 
of issues. Preferably mobilisation among the civil servants at subnational level is 
built from below and not in a top-down manner. A top-down manner often entails 
a lack of participatory processes at subnational level. The stakeholders which then 
did not take part often see themselves as co-opted into the structure, where their 
possibilities to influence are limited. Consequently there can be a too wide gap 
between those who formed the co-operation and funded it and those who have to 
set up the programme and are responsible for the daily management. In some of 
the worst cases a mobilisation in opposition against the co-operation can take 
place or at least critical agents that have not had their say in the initial part can act 
as brokers for the co-operation (Healey et al 2003 p.82). 
Finally, public support is also essential in terms of mobilisation capacity. 
However the criterion of public support varies depending on the co-operation’s 
structure. Thus the public opinion may sometimes be very powerful; an issue 
network only requires the public not to constrain the co-operation. Mostly in a 
policy network and definitely in a policy community, where politicians have a say 
and public money are spent, the public opinion must be even more considered. 
For a policy network and a policy community, public support also captures an 
interest to participate in projects. It is when people participate in projects or even 
in the policy making that they start to deliberate and become politically active 
(Hajer 2003 p.89). This public involvement at subnational level may be very 
essential when it comes to internal mobilization capacity. 
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6 The establishment process of the 
South Baltic co-operation 
This chapter considers the establishment process of the South Baltic co-operation 
from the perspective outlined in the first theoretical chapter. This and the 
subsequent chapters are predominately based on the material obtained from the 
conducted interviews. In order to make the text easy to read and refer to in an 
appropriate way different abbreviations are employed. 
Representatives from the European Commission are abbreviated EU and the 
representative from the Joint Technical Secretariat has the acronym JTS. 
Likewise, the author of the cross-border co-operation’s programme is simply 
named AUTHOR. National actors’ and subnational actors’ abbreviations start with 
an N respectively SN. After these letters a county code describes the actors’ 
nationality (i.e. DK, GER, LIT, PL and SWE). To illustrate, a subnational actor 
from Denmark would than be referred as SN.DK. A list of interviewees’ names 
and the pertained abbreviations is attached in Appendix 1. 
6.1 The garbage can model – different policy streams 
within and across the South Baltic 
Co-operations on local, regional and national level grew rapidly in the Baltic See 
area after the Cold War and also due to the European Union enlargements. There 
are nowadays as many co-operations in Baltic See area that most interviewees see 
no possibility to actually know them all. However the most foremost are: 
HELCOM (Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commission), BSPC (Baltic 
Sea Parliamentary Conference), CPMR (Conference of Peripheral Maritime 
Regions of Europe), UBC (Union ofthe Baltic Cities), BCCA (Baltic Sea 
Chambers of Commerce Association), BARDI (Baltic Alliance of Regional 
Development Institutions), BSSSC (Baltic Sea States Subregional Cooperation), 
VASAB 2010 (Visions and Strategies around the Baltic Sea), Baltic 21 (An 
Agenda 21 for the Baltic Sea Region), CBSS (Council of the Baltic Sea States) and 
NCM (Nordic Council of Ministers) (South Baltic Cross-border Co-operation 
Programme, 2007). 
Even though the members of the South Baltic co-operation mostly are 
represented in the above mentioned co-operations these co-operations are not 
particularly aimed for the South Baltic area and do not have a cross-border 
perspective. There are rather two other co-operations that in this case deserve 
more attention; Euroregion Baltic and Euroregion Pomerania. The Euroregions 
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were established in the mid-nineties in order to facilitate the accession of Poland 
into the European Union (SN.DK). They both have different strategies of how to 
co-operate. Euroregion Baltic, which embraces regions of Denmark, Lithuania, 
Poland, Russia and Sweden, is the one that has been most visible and active (JTS). 
In addition, they have since 2006 their own Joint Development programme named 
Seagull. Seagull contains a development strategy for the next 10 years and an 
action programme prioritising a number of activities within the four focus areas of 
the strategy (SN.EUBAL). The idea behind this programme was that it one day 
would became an Interreg programme, funded by the EU (SN.SWE2). The 
Euroregion Pomerania has in comparison not been as visible; even if they also 
have their own agenda on what they consider as most important regarding 
collaboration (JTS, SN.EURPOM). The Euroregion Pomerania extends over the 
Northwest of Poland, the South of Sweden and the Northeast of Germany 
(www.pomerania.net, 09.08.01) 
When applying the garbage can model, it can be interpreted as the Euroregion 
Baltic’s development programme; Seagull was something that was already in the 
garbage can. It was waiting for the right opportunity to join other policy streams, 
for example resources. However, Seagull was not the single solution that needed 
resources. Different regions within the South Baltic area preferred a diverse range 
of co-operation structures. For example, Skåne, the south region in Sweden has 
for many years been a member of the co-operation Öresund, together with regions 
in Denmark and had a strong interest that it should continue (SN.SWE1). In some 
north German parts there also existed Interreg programme, with Denmark in 
northeast and Poland in west. The national representatives were very keen to keep 
these co-operations (N.GER2). Yet, Rostock in north Germany was quite 
disappointed with the situation since they were not included in any cross-border 
co-operations funding by Interreg at all (SN.GER). Consequently, Rostock’s 
vision was another policy stream that waited for change. 
Likewise, actors in Poland did not have the same opinions about co-operation 
structures. The west parts were only interested in co-operating with Germany. 
Several regions, also members of the Euroregion Baltic, did prefer the idea 
suggested by Euroregion Baltic of whom to co-operate with. Although, Gdansk 
which also is a member of the Euroregion Baltic had their own agenda on how 
they want to co-operate (SN.EURBAL). Gdansk was at a first point not interested 
to involve Germany and Lithuania in a co-operation. This was based on a survey 
conducted by the city of Gdansk of which regions that would be most attractive to 
co-operate with (SN.PL). Finally, even Lithuania did already have deep-rooted 
co-operation with the Baltic States and Russia which they prioritised (EU.1). 
To sum up the situation; before the South Baltic co-operation became reality, 
there were a diverse range of ideas of how to co-operate. This can be illustrated 
with a garbage can with a flow of different policy streams still waiting to be 
processed and joined. 
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6.2 Policy windows opened the opportunity for the 
South Baltic cross-border co-operation 
In the European Union’s previous Cohesion period 2000-06 Interreg funding was 
not one of the main priorities. For the new period 2007-13, the Commission 
decided to change its regulations and European territorial co-operation became 
one of the three main pillars in the EU’s Cohesion policy (Cohesion policy 2007-
13 – Commentaries and official texts, January 2007 p.10). The new regulation 
implied that the Commission wanted all regions at the borders within the EU to 
participate in a cross-border co-operation. They also made clear that they did not 
want to have too many small programmes. The new regulation further allows 
cross-border co-operations crossing land-sea borders if the distance is not more 
than 150 kilometres. A so called policy window had opened for establishing new 
cross-border co-operations within the framework of Interreg. 
After the regulations were changed the Commission contacted the national 
governments which had regions that bordered other European regions, in order to 
discuss how new cross border co-operations could be established. The reason that 
they contacted the national governments was that they should have the 
responsibility and also finance a bigger part of the Interreg programmes. 
Consequently, the years before 2007 a process was started and new cross-border 
co-operations were formed all over Europe. In the Baltic Sea the Central Baltic 
programme was established and also all borders in north were included in 
different Interreg programmes. In the South Baltic area different discussions took 
place, but the 150 kilometres rule limited the possibilities to establish one or even 
two cross-border co-operations. For example, the distance between Poland and 
Sweden is longer than 150 kilometres. However, several actors thought that they 
through lobbying could make EU compromise on the 150 kilometres rule. They 
knew that the EU reinforced co-operations and that EU did not want to exclude 
any parts within the EU (EU2, N.SWE, SN.DK). One interviewee also mentioned 
the South Baltic case as a spill-over effect. All other co-operations were already 
set in the Baltic Sea area and South Baltic was what was left and could therefore 
benefit of a so called spillover effect (N.SWE). 
Although, the South Baltic was still too controversial, as too many of the EU’s 
rules had to be broken. In the early spring of 2006, any formal meeting between 
the actors in the South Baltic area had still not been held. At this point most actors 
knew that the so called policy window was at that time partly open and would 
only be open a short time before it would close. If they did not take advantage of 
the opportunity, they would have to wait for the next cohesion period 2013-19. 
Consequently, they needed a quick deal in order to agree on how the co-operation 
should be framed, which included writing the cross-border co-operation 
programme and submitting a final version to the national governments in 
November 2006 and one to the Commission before December 2006 (Minutes, 
Gdansk 23.08.2006, Minutes, Karlskrona 02.11.2006)). 
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To sum up the situation, the EU had through a new regulation opened a policy 
window and created an opportunity for cross-border co-operation programmes to 
be approved and financed. Nevertheless the policy window was only partly open 
in the South Baltic case, since the 150 kilometres rule still limited co-operations 
with a longer distance across seas. In addition, the South Baltic area was also a 
special case composing regions from five countries that all had different 
preferences of how a co-operation could be framed. Consequently, a policy 
window was partly open, but two problems remained. Firstly, someone needed to 
further open the so called policy window. Secondly, the policy streams had not 
been coupled. 
6.3 How policy entrepreneurs influenced the 
establishment process 
Due to the EU’s new regulation Sweden and Denmark could receive remarkably 
more EU funding for interregional co-operation. Putting more emphasis on 
European territorial co-operation and allowing co-operations across the sea, this 
meant that Sweden actually could receive more than double what they did the 
previous period for interregional co-operations (N.SWE). Since Sweden and 
Denmark are not eligible for objective 1, (Convergence), and proportionately 
receive a smaller amount in object 2 (Regional competitiveness and employment), 
they were and still are motivated to work for the funding from the objective 3 
(European territorial cooperation). On the other hand, Poland and other new EU 
member states are not dedicated to objective 3, since they already receive a bigger 
amount of funds through objective 1 and 2. They are also aware of the fact that if 
the EU put more emphasis on objective 3, the amount for objectives 1 and 2 will 
probably decrease and these countries as a result loose funding (AUTHOR, 
SN.EUBAL). 
Due to economic reasons the initial motivations for cross-border co-operations 
were bigger in Sweden and Denmark than in the other countries. This was 
moreover noticeable in the beginning of the establishment process. The two 
Swedish member regions of the Euroregion Baltic; Kalmar and Blekinge felt a 
bigger support from their national government than other regions in the other 
countries did. Skåne, the third region in Sweden that already had a co-operation 
with Denmark was not initially very active. The establishment process therefore 
began in Sweden where Kalmar and Blekinge were very keen to establish a cross-
border co-operation so they could be eligible for Interreg funding. Their initial 
goal was to establish an Interreg programme covering the same area as the 
Euroregion Baltic (SN.EURBAL, SNSWE1, SNSWE2). 
However, Euroregion Baltic area was not seen as a good alternative. Firstly, 
the actors from the Swedish government wanted bigger programmes in line with 
the EU Commission (N.SWE). Secondly, the Euroregion Baltic called for an 
European neighbourhood programme, so Kalingrad one of the organisation’s 
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members could take part, but the idea did not receive any support from the EU 
(SN.EUBAL). Thirdly, if it became the same area as the Euroregion Baltic, 
Euroregion Pommerania would than be abandoned. Moreover, Skåne also 
declared that they did not want to transform Euroregion Pommerania into an 
Interreg programme. Skåne, was after a promise that the Öresund region would 
not be affected more in favour to be included in the Euroregion Baltic area. An 
interviewee representing Skåne in Euroregion Pomerania expresses it as “we left 
our friends” in Pommerania and finally we became allied with Kalmar and 
Blekinge (SN.EUPOM). 
Despite the problems mentioned above no one really gave up. The regions in 
Sweden and most regions in the Euroregion Baltic were convinced that they could 
become a cross-border co-operation in the framework of Interreg. However, the 
150 kilometres rule was very problematic and that both the Swedish government 
started against the Commission. Representatives from the Euroregion Baltic were 
very active but with much help and support from the Swedish government. 
Finally, the Commission signalled that they maybe could compromise on the 150 
kilometres rule but they then wanted parts of Lithuania, Germany, and moreover 
one region in Poland within the co-operation, that is to say Lithuania as well as 
the parts from Euroregion Pomerania (EU2). The Euroregion Baltic felt happiness 
about that the EU was willing to compromise but was not very pleased about the 
fact that the Euroregion Baltic area could not be eligible as an Interreg 
programme. Many times during the process they suggested two sub-programmes 
within the South Baltic programme, which repeatedly were rejected by the EU 
and national representatives from Sweden, Denmark and Poland (SN.EUBAL, 
Minutes from Gdansk 17.10.2006) 
In situations like this when there are a lot of different preferences and policy 
streams that are not coupling; it is as explained in the theory necessary with a few 
policy entrepreneurs. These must be willing to invest their resources in time, 
energy, reputation and money in order to soften up the system and push through a 
decision. These must further have special qualities in order to be the driving force 
in the process. When the interviewees in the South Baltic co-operation were asked 
to name a key person they all pin-pointed a Swedish national representative 
named Ulf Savbäck as the motor for the establishment of the co-operation. 
Subnational interviewees agreed that they would not be able to establish the South 
Baltic programme without him and the qualities he had (SN.DK, SN.SWE1, 
SN.SWE2). An interviewee remarks that he had both formal and informal power 
since he represented the national government. He also had a wider experience of 
how to establish new cross-border co-operations in the framework of Interreg and 
moreover he had good negotiation skills. At last he was committed and had strong 
belief that it would be possible to establish a cross-co-operation despite the 
obstacles (SN.SWE1). Another subnational interviewee claims that if the national 
actors had not participated the establishment process would not have been so 
successful. Furthermore, he states that it is because of the national level that the 
establishment process worked so smoothly (SN.DK). However, it is significant 
that the South Baltic co-operation was established in the way Swedish national 
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actors wanted and the requests from subnational actors to have two sub-
programmes were not particularly considered. 
Also the polish subnational representatives that had started to discuss with 
Sweden noted that they did not have the competence to establish an Interreg 
programme and that they were dependent on their national level. However, the 
national government in Poland hesitated. Regional actors from Gdansk sent them 
a large quantity of letters signed by the Marshall (the president of the region) to 
encourage the national government, but for a long time it was not successful 
(SN.PL). The so called Swedish national policy entrepreneur himself admitted 
that they changed their mind when he suggested that Poland could be responsible 
for the Managing Authority and that the Joint Technical Secretariat could have its 
base in Gdansk (N.SWE). A polish national interviewee partly confirmed and said 
that this gave some form of “prestige” (N.PL). Interestingly it was the national 
actor’s achievement that contributed to the polish national level decision to invest 
their time, energy and money on the co-operation. The power from Polish and 
Swedish subnational actors was accordingly too weak. 
After the decision by the Polish government, there were now both subnational 
and national actors from Sweden and Poland that could start to establish a co-
operation. Within was also a subnational actor from Bornholm in Denmark. He 
has been described as person with high commitment to different kinds of co-
operations (ibid). That is to say he was another policy entrepreneur but on the 
Danish side. The national representatives from Denmark did not have any 
resources and time to take part in the initial phase, so they gave the subnational 
actor all the responsibility (SN:DK). This does in some sense show that the 
Danish national level did not consider that the cross-border co-operation could 
undermine the power of the nation-state. 
Lithuania and Germany were also encouraged to participate and were invited 
to the meetings but they never showed up. The regional representatives started 
drafting a programme but thought that no further steps should be taken before 
Lithuania and Germany had changed their minds and joined (Minutes from 
Gdansk 24.05.2006 and Szczecin.28.06.2006). Without their participation the 
Commission would likely not approve the programme. Lithuania changed their 
mind in the summer of 2006. In Lithuania there is no regional level so everything 
was decided on a national level. The reason for why they hesitated was that the 
EU’s funding would be the same to the country whether they joined or not. Hence, 
it was necessary that they were fully convinced that this programme had 
numerous advantages. 
Germany was the last country that had to change their mind. Swedish national 
actors went several times to Germany in order to convince them to join but 
without any results. Although, suddenly Germany expressed their willingness to 
join the South Baltic Programme. There was none amongst the actors who really 
understood why they changed their mind. However, the interviews conducted with 
German actors explain how the process in Germany also was dependent on policy 
entrepreneurs. Three different key persons have been identified as policy 
entrepreneurs. Firstly, one subnational actor was fighting for Rostock’s rights to 
belong to an Interreg programme. He explains Meckenburg-Vorpommern’s 
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parliament resistance that they instead had a willingness to support other weaker 
regions in their state. It was thought that Rostock was already too powerful city 
compared to others in the state and had got “endless of privileged” both during 
Hitler’s time and also during the era of communism. The majority in the 
parliament in Schwerin preferred therefore rather weaker parts of its state 
(SN.GER). A second policy entrepreneur that Rostock took help from was a 
national actor who was asked to convince his colleagues. He explains that his own 
role was to convince his colleagues, who have not understood the potential of the 
programme and its benefit. His colleagues did not realise that they would lose 
funding if they did not join. They stilled hoped that they could use the EU funding 
for some of Meckenburg Vorpommern’s other programmes (N.GER2). A third 
policy entrepreneur came from the region Sjaeland in Denmark and he spent a lot 
of time in order to convince the Germans to take part. Sjeaeland in contrast to 
Germany did not favour a separate cross-border co-operation between the regions 
from the both states. Sjealand rather wanted Germany within South Baltic for the 
reason that Germany still is the prime co-operation partner to Sjeaeland (SN.GER, 
SN.DK). These three policy entrepreneurs and the fact that the state chancellor 
was changed to one that originally came from Rostock, contributed to that 
Germany finally declared their interest to join in the South Baltic co-operation. 
Even though all subnations now had agreed on the co-operation area and that 
the EU at the same time had given its confirmation that this was a suitable area for 
an Interreg programme, it did not mean that the establishment process was 
completely finished. The programme had to be written and it was necessary to 
agree upon the priorities axis that would state the contents of the programme. The 
writing process was partly delegated to the subnational representatives and will 
therefore be discussed in the chapter about the horizontal dimension.  
Despite the fact that not the whole establishment process has been described in 
this chapter, it is at this point possible to answer the research question of what and 
whom that drove the process to establish the South Baltic cross-border co-
operation. Firstly, it has been illustrated that the establishment process was not 
driven by a defined problem in the South Baltic area that needed a solutions. 
Rather, there was an array of policy streams of problems, solutions, participants 
and the participants’ resources and in particular different suggestions of how to 
co-operate. These so called policy streams had not been joined and waited for the 
right opportunity. When the EU changed their regulation the opportunity arose 
and a policy window opened for land-sea cross-border co-operations. Actors knew 
that if the policy streams were quickly joined a South Baltic co-operation could be 
possible. Hence the EU’s action can be seen as the stepping point of the 
establishment process.  
However, the policy streams would not be joined by themselves. Without any 
policy entrepreneurs the process would cease. Likewise, without any earlier co-
operations and partnerships the establishment process would probably take longer 
than the accepted timeframe. As described there has been a few policy 
entrepreneurs defined almost from all countries, representing both subnational and 
national level. Nevertheless it was a Swedish policy entrepreneur that played the 
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most essential role in order to couple the policy streams, softening up the system 
and who made participants compromise. 
At last, it is from analysing the earliest steps in the establishment process 
possible to comment on whether the cross-border co-operation strengthen or 
undermine the power of the nation-state. Even though subnational actors were 
active in the process, it was the EU and the national level and particular the 
Swedish one that were the most determining factors for in the formation of the 
South Baltic co-operation. Consequently, since the national states were positively 
active the new cross-border co-operation could not really be seen as a challenge to 
the nation-state. Putting together different subnations with no common existing 
local co-operation structures and no common agenda, and where national actors 
had the power of the structure could barely undermine the national level. Rather, 
the cross-border co-operation in lack of own local co-operation structures may 
have to depend more upon the central authorities and are most likely employed in 
the context of states general policy objectives. 
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7 The vertical dimension in the case of 
the South Baltic co-operation 
The purpose of this chapter is to understand the South Baltic cross-border co-
operation’s power dependence upon the EU and the national governments. This 
may however first require an insight into what kind of cross-border co-operation it 
is. Hence the first section in this chapter seeks to explore the co-operation’s 
structure trough the created regional ideal types in chapter 4 (also illustrated in a 
model on page 19). The second section can then shed light on how and to what 
extent the EU and the national states can influence and determine the South Baltic 
co-operation’s opportunities to be maintained and deepened. 
7.1 The character of the South Baltic co-operation 
As previously indicated the South Baltic co-operation constitutes a territory with 
border regions of five EU Member States. Thus neither the membership is 
fluctuating, nor the co-operation area is territorial delimitated, it can at an early 
stage be falsified that the co-operation would be an issue network. The 
membership in South Baltic co-operation is rather quite defined as well as the 
territorial area of the co-operation. 
Considering the membership, the co-operation is formalised in one Steering 
Committee (SC) and one Monitoring Committee (MC), where the different 
countries have appointed their own national and subnational representatives. The 
Steering Committee decides on which projects should be approved and the 
Monitoring Committee are responsible for the overall questions for example; 
implementation of the programme, how money is spent and if they want to change 
the structure of the programme (JTS). 
The eligible area is also quite defined even though it is not completely 
territorial delimited as it would be in a policy community. A map of the co-
operation area is attached in Appendix 2. Depending on where the regions are 
situated, they are divided into different categories. Firstly, there is a core 
programme area. The subnations included in this area have among others a vote in 
the MC and the SC. Secondly, there are adjacent areas. Thirdly, Kaliningrad can 
take part on other conditions. The adjacent areas are allowed to participate in 
projects up to a limit of 20 percent of the programmes’ expenditures applicable to 
the entire programme area and Kaliningrad up to 10 percent (South Baltic Cross-
Border Co-operation Programme, 2007 p.7). It is also possible for actors in other 
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regions in the five countries to take part, if the projects purpose is to improve the 
state of the South Baltic area (JTS). 
Interaction is another thing that differs between an issue network, a policy 
network and a policy community. Also here it is significant that the South Baltic 
co-operation is most similar to a policy network. The interaction is not frequent as 
in the case of a policy community but yet on a regular basis. The SC and the MC 
have meetings twice a year. However, the Monitoring Authority in Warsaw and 
the Contact Points, which are small offices widespread over co-operation area 
assisting the project partners, meet four times a year (N.PL1). 
In addition, the South Baltic’s interest is identical with a policy network 
constricted and contracted to some agreed policy areas. The South Baltic co-
operation’s operational programme outlines two main priorities, in which funds 
are available for project partners. Firstly, Economic competitiveness focus on 
“actions promoting integration of economic and labour markets in the area, co-
operation in technical and higher education, transfer of knowledge and know-how 
between public and private actors and better transport connectivity”. Secondly, the 
last priority axis, Attractiveness and common identity focus on “management of 
environmental threats and actions promoting sustainable economic use of natural 
resources and cultural heritage, with particular attention to tourism, development 
of renewable energy sources and energy saving, as well as local initiatives 
supporting people to-people contacts” (South Baltic Cross-Border Co-operation 
Programme, 2007 p.28). This implies that focus is on some selected co-operation 
areas and where it is decided how much of the funds each priority theme is 
allocated. Moreover no general value-system for all issue areas is required, which 
would be the case in a policy community. 
Finally, there are other hallmarks of a policy network that are in line with the 
South Baltic co-operation. For instance the South Baltic co-operation is 
characterised by a long-term co-operation aim and its main activities are 
realisation of concrete projects (AUTHOR, SN.DK). 
To conclude the description of the South Baltic co-operation it is clear that 
most of its hallmarks are comparable with a policy network. The point of 
departure for the thesis’s next section is therefore a policy network. Consequently, 
maintaining a cross-border co-operation would mean, to avoid returning to a co-
operation in terms of an issue network. To deepen a cross-border co-operation 
would either be within the policy network or to tighten the co-operation through 
establishing a policy community. 
7.2 How the vertical dimensions may influence and 
determine a maintaining and deepening 
Since policy networks main task is to realise concrete projects financial resources 
are necessary both to carry out projects and to the assistance to the co-ordinated 
organisation. In a policy network the financial resources are mainly sponsored 
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from either the EU or from the national governments. The South Baltic cross-
border co-operation’s financial dependence seems to be no exception. The head 
officer of the JTS thinks that South Baltic co-operation is a very significant case. 
She states that a cross-border co-operation without any external resources would 
not be possible. Further, she explains that the strength of the regional level varies 
between the different countries and that many subnations do not have their own 
financial resources. In Poland and Sweden the regions are strong since they have 
their own budget and strategy to implement. On the other hand, the regional level 
in Lithuania is weak since most financial resources are regulated by the national 
government. The subnations from Germany participating in the South Baltic co-
operation are only small municipalities; similarly to the parts in Lithuania they do 
not have any wider capital of financial resources (JTS, EU2). Since all members 
in a policy community have their own resources it is understood that a policy 
community in the South Baltic area from a financial point of view would not be 
possible until the subnations dispose their own resources. 
A high dependence on financial resources consequently leads to increased 
legal dependence and a national influence of the operational discretion. When the 
national level contributes with financial resources, it is also obvious that their 
influence may increase in regard to what opportunity the cross-border co-
operation has to be maintained or deepened. If national governments do not want 
to change their legislations and regulations to facilitate cross-border co-operation, 
it may for example hamper the cross-border co-operation’s opportunities to be 
deepened. This has actually been the case twice in the South Baltic co-operation. 
Firstly, the national level in Germany rejected projects to start at their own 
risk before they had been formally approved. This was in many ways seen as an 
obstacle for several projects. One interviewee indicates that this was a very 
critical situation for the whole cross-border co-operation. However, it ended up 
with the Commission persuading the Germans to change their procedures 
(N.PL1). According to subnational actors, a second constraint in terms of 
legislation is the fact that a few countries have not implemented the European 
Group for Territorial Cooperation (EGTC). EGTC’s purpose is to facilitate the 
possibilities for the Euroregions to independently apply for projects funding. 
Nowadays one of the member regions must instead be a so called lead partner, 
which impedes the authority of the Euroregions (SN.DK, SN.EUBAL). To 
summarise the legal dependence, most interviewees do not recognise that the legal 
dependency constrain the co-operations’ opportunity to be maintained. However, 
earlier experience shows that the interest to delegate further legal authority to the 
subnational level is very low. So, in terms of legal authority a closer co-operation 
in forms of a policy community would in time not be possible. 
Moreover the fact that the national governments decide upon the level of 
economical contributions results in limited operational discretion. Even if the 
South Baltic co-operation receives 75 Million EUR from the EU and the national 
states it is a comparatively small amount. Subnational interviewees declare that 
this is a problem and limitation to the programme (SN.EUBAL). For example 
only soft projects are possible, where the outcome may not be fully observable 
(AUTHOR). 
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A second factor that may constrain subnational actor’s operational discretion 
is the EU’s guidelines for the structure and the contents of the operational 
programme. The guidelines do to some degree regulate which priorities the 
Commission thinks should be covered within the programmes. For the present 
period the Commission in line with the Gothenburg and the Lisbon strategies 
focused particularly on economical growth and protection of the environment 
(SN.DK). Elisabeth Helander who represented the Commission in the early stage 
of the South Baltic’s establishment process, was keen to establish a cross-border 
co-operation that could contribute to reducing the environmental problems in the 
Baltic Sea. It is therefore no coincidence that the South Baltic programme does 
finance projects which relate to environmental protection (N.SWE). As long as 
the EU and the national states finance the co-operation, there also needs to be 
coherence between this and other programmes (for example the transnational 
Baltic Sea Programme and the Central Baltic Sea programme), which furthermore 
diminish the opportunity for subnational actors to independently decide upon the 
structure and the contents of the programme (AUTHOR). 
A third factor that may constrain subnational actor’s operational discretion is 
the fact that national representatives always are involved in the decision-making 
process in both the MC and the SC and can stop decisions they do not agree with. 
This implies that the national will is always secured. 
Consequently, the subnational actors’ operational discretion is quite limited, 
but what is then the opportunity that this operational discretion can increase or at 
least not decrease? From the EU’s point of view the reinforcement for cross-
border co-operations is generally very strong but also particularly strong for the 
South Baltic co-operation. This period compared to previous, the Commission has 
put more emphasis on cross-border co-operation and territorial co-operation. 
Furthermore, an EU representative notes that “for the discussion leading up to the 
next period we talk much more about this kind of co-operation regarding what we 
ever have done before”. An additional financial contribution for the next period 
may therefore be plausible. The EU may also positively influence subnational 
actors’ operational discretion, thus the changing of the system funding is being 
discussed. Instead of having today’s system where the contributions go through 
the national level, the Commission plans to directly fund the programmes, which 
would make the programmes more independent from the countries. Moreover, the 
interviewee representing the Commission expresses a special support for the 
South Baltic co-operation due to it embracing both new and old member states. 
He claims that one of the main functions with the cohesion funds is to ascertain 
division between rich and poor parts of Europe, which the South Baltic co-
operation could have a high potential to (EU2). As follows, the EU does from 
today’s condition support a maintaining of the co-operation and there is neither 
any reason to see that the EU would constrain a deepening of the South Baltic co-
operation. If the plans to change the funding system are realised a deepening of 
the co-operation may even take place. 
The national reinforcement is though more diverged, even if most of the 
national actors have a positive approach towards the co-operation. The greatest 
reinforcement exists in Sweden and Poland, who also are the countries that 
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voluntarily sponsor the programme most. A polish actor points out, “there is no 
reason to initiate a programme, give chance to the beneficial and then after some 
years cut off the sources” (N.PL). National interviewees from Sweden, Poland and 
Lithuania also state that programmes like this could be good for the countries as a 
whole (N.SWE, N.PL, N.LIT). A stakeholder from the national government in 
Lithuania states that “the South Baltic programme directly impacts economic and 
cultural life of the whole of Lithuania” (N.LIT). Despite these countries positive 
attitude towards the South Baltic co-operation the Swedish and Polish actors give 
no signals that they would support a deepening of the co-operation that for 
instance would mean more operational discretion to the subnational level as in the 
case of a policy community. In contrast, a Swedish subnational actor recognises 
the overriding threat from the national states to centralise the programme 
(SN.SWE1). It is obvious that the national actors are satisfied with current co-
operation structure and consider the South Baltic co-operation as a way to 
strengthen the national states.  
Judging from the interviews, Germany is the only country that would not 
actively support to maintain the cross-border co-operation. A national actor 
expresses it as follows “behind the scenes you can see another interest from 
Sweden than from Germany”. Her explanation is that this programme makes a 
remarkably little difference, since it is such a small part of Germany participating 
(N.GER1). A German politician responsible for regional development expresses it 
“es ist egal ob es South Baltic heißt oder etwas anderes” (N.GER3), that is to say 
it does not matter if Germany take part in the South Baltic or in other co-
operations. A third German actor claims that the process to get a project 
application approved is very complicated and that he would not advice a normal 
municipality to take part in the programme. Furthermore he states that the fact that 
everything is in English complicates the programme and implies that most 
beneficiaries need to have an English spoken consult and the national actors must 
also in addition be fluent in English (N.GER2). An anonymous person confirms 
the low interest from the German national level and states that “it is a scandal” 
that the head of the German delegation does not speak English and cannot 
accordingly defend Germany’s concern in the SC and the MC. It should also be 
added that the new head of the German delegation renounced an interview and 
that it was very difficult to find interviewees in Germany since most of early 
delegations have resigned. Evaluating Germans national actors’ way to argue it is 
clear that since they do not see any added value at national level, their interest for 
the co-operation is limited. 
A last factor that will likely influence a maintaining or deepening of the South 
Baltic co-operation and which also partly confirm that the South Baltic co-
operation is a tool in order to strengthen the national states own goals is the new 
Baltic Sea Strategy. The main stakeholders in the strategy represent the national 
level and the European Commission, even if the regional level has been heard 
(N.GER2). At the Commission’s webpage it is stated that “the Strategy aims at 
coordinating action by Member States, regions, the EU, pan-Baltic organisations, 
financing institutions and non-governmental bodies to promote a more balanced 
development of the region.” Furthermore four cornerstones are outlined to make 
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the Baltic Sea more environmentally sustainable, prosperous, accessible and 
attractive and safe and secure (www.ec.europe.eu, 30.07.2009). It is obvious that 
the Baltic Sea Strategy purpose is to capture a macro-thinking. All cross-border 
co-operations in the Baltic Sea will play an important function when it comes to 
implementing the strategy. In fact, ongoing projects need to be checked so that 
they are in line with the Baltic Sea Strategy before they can be approved (N.PL). 
The Baltic Sea Strategy has also listed eighty different kinds of projects they want 
to have carried out. If a partner wish to carry out one of the projects, their 
application to do so is more probable to pass. This implies that subnational actors’ 
operational discretion will be even more constrained and that a development from 
the today’s policy network towards a more independent policy community is 
precluded. 
However, the effects of the Baltic Sea Strategy are still to this day unknown. It 
is clear that the Swedish and Finish government have the greatest interest since 
them both to a large extent border the Baltic Sea. A German interviewee that 
recently worked for the Commission states that Sweden and Finland are the 
driving force and tries to find alliance for their own political objectives. Some of 
the other countries do not see a wider added value with the strategy say “we are a 
little more laid back and we will play your game but we are not too enthusiastic” 
(N.GER2). 
Consequently, the Baltic Sea Strategy will affect the South Baltic’s 
opportunity to be maintained and deepened even if it is unknown to what extent. 
However, it is clear that national actors hold a macro-thinking and do not see the 
South Baltic co-operation as a part by itself, rather a co-operation that should be 
co-ordinated with other programmes and enhance the states capacity to achieve 
their objectives. To conclude the vertical dimension, a maintaining is most likely 
due to; EU’s reinforcement, most national actor keenness and also since the Baltic 
Sea Strategy supports cross-border co-operations in the Baltic Sea area. However, 
a deepening in terms of a policy community is not from a national point of view 
an alternative since no added value can be seen. Current co-operation structure is 
from a national point of view the most optimal co-operation structure. They then 
take part in the decision-making process, control the development of the co-
operation and can also take advantage of the co-operation. A deeper co-operation 
in form of a policy community would only imply less control by the states and the 
advantages for the states are from the national point of view estimated to be 
diminished or unchanged. 
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8 The horizontal dimension in the case 
of the South Baltic co-operation 
In the previous chapter it was concluded from a vertical dimension point of view 
that a maintaining of the South Baltic co-operation as a policy network is most 
likely. The national reinforcement is though not specially directed to the South 
Baltic co-operation. Most of the national actors have rather a more generally 
encouraging approach towards all cross-border co-operations and see them as a 
tool in order to strengthen their own political objectives. It has been indicated that 
a deepening of a co-operation can undermine the power of the nation-state within 
the co-operation area and the national governments would therefore constrain a 
development towards a policy community. 
However, subnational actors may also have the potential to influence the co-
operation’s opportunity to be maintained or deepened. From an agency 
perspective the horizontal dimension should have the ability and capacity to 
determine its own future. If the territorial entitles match each other and the co-
operation has a high level of bottom-up involvement and if it is promoted by 
subnational actors, the greater is the chances that they can influence their own 
destiny. With a strong unification it is also assumed that they to a higher extent 
can undermine the power of the nation-state. 
In the theoretical chapter about the horizontal dimension a framework was 
outlined for how to analyse subnational actors’ opportunity to maintain and 
deepen their cross-border co-operation. If they should be able to maintain or 
deepen their co-operation some factors must be fulfilled. First after these factors 
are fulfilled it can be discussed whether the cross-border co-operation can 
undermine the power of the national-state. The factors discussed in subsequent 
parts are also illustrated in a figure on page 20. 
8.1 Strategic unification and relation resources 
Subnational actors’ potential to influence the co-operation’s opportunity to be 
maintained or deepened often relies on a feeling of strategic unification. If 
subnational actors do not feel any strategic unification they will probably be quite 
indifferent to either maintain or deepen the co-operation. In order to experience 
strategic unification some technical factors must primarily be fulfilled. In the case 
of the South Baltic co-operation the technical factors do not correspond to a 
policy network rather merely an issue network. 
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Most subnational interviewees are neither satisfied with the size of the 
population nor the geography. Statements like “we are too many” and “the 
geography is artificial” is repeatedly expressed during the interviews (SN.DK, 
SN.EURBAL, SN.GER, SN.SWE1). Most actors desire smaller programmes and 
each interviewee suggests other geographic co-operation structures than the one 
today. For example Rostock wants to include Berlin and Schleswig-Holstein 
(SN.GER). Euroregion Baltic attempts to reshape the current co-operation and 
move it eastwards. Skåne, is on the other hand of different opinions, where the 
municipalities want to co-operate with Poland and Germany but where the region 
prioritises other countries, like China (SN.EURPOM). The head office of the JTS 
also notes that the co-operation was artificially created and that it is not a natural 
cross-border region. Furthermore, she states that sometimes it is hard to find 
projects that benefit all counterparts due to the sea (JTS). A last technical factor 
that constrains a deepening of the co-operation at the moment is that the South 
Baltic area shows strong development disparities between the respective 
subnations and that the economical exchange is not as high as would be the case 
in a policy network and particular a policy community would require (SN.PL). 
The co-operation area includes both one of the richest regions in the EU as well as 
one of the poorest. (South Baltic Cross-Border Co-operation Programme, 2007 
p.10). 
The economical disparities can also be reflected in various objectives for 
action and intervention within the co-operation. If subnational actors should have 
the ability to influence the co-operation’s opportunities to be deepened or 
maintained a policy network, they must have a mutually shared vision and 
interest. However, the subnations are on such different economical levels and 
have different priorities in issues. This, among others factors, became clear when 
subnational actors were delegated to write the substance of the programme. Their 
visions and interests were so widely divergent that the subnational actors could 
not agree upon the priorities axis. One interviewee remarks that she has never 
before attended a meeting with such an aggressive spirit and with so dominant 
people (SN.SWE). Another says, that the discussions were so heated that we 
almost hurt each other (SN.DK). A third stakeholder states that “people stuck to 
their guns” (SN.EURBAL). Finally, the process stranded and the actors decided to 
call for help. The consultant hired explains in the interview about the competing 
priorities. Sweden wanted to use the funding for innovation, Poland defended the 
importance of infrastructure, Germany argued for social issues like well-being of 
its citizens. Furthermore, Bornholm wanted to fund people to-people activities. 
All these intentions should also follow the guidelines from the EU and be in 
coherence with other programmes. The consult states, “It required quite a lot of 
experience from me to say what worked and what did not and to find a proposal 
that all could agree upon” (AUTHOR). All subnational actors do also confirm that 
they would not manage it by themselves. What is indicated is that some of the 
participants tried to influence the outcome, only considering their own territorial 
interest. Actors’ ambitions were so diverged that they needed someone that 
unified them, which in some sense shows the weakness and the lack of capacity of 
subnational to single-handedly unify the region. 
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A third factor, which also has been identified as a relation resource, is a 
common identity. However, it was argued that this is more essential in closer co-
operations like a policy community. In the case of the South Baltic co-operation 
none of the interviewees recognises that the region has a common identity. 
Nevertheless, many emphasises a common identity as one of the programme’s 
goals, even though most interviewees do not think it is possible to build a 
common identity in the framework of this programme. Consequently, the common 
identity which is to prefer for a policy community is in the South Baltic not likely 
in the near future. 
If a cross-border co-operation should be able to deepen their co-operation a 
forth factor in the analytical framework emphasises cultural and institutional 
similarities as vital. Considering similarities within the South Baltic co-operation 
several subnational actors mentioned the regions’ common history. Although, the 
cultural similarities that once existed were erased mostly during the fifty years of 
communism (SN.PL). Today’s co-operation must therefore, according to one 
subnational actor, start to “bring together what belongs together” (SN.GER). 
None of the subnational actors think that the cultural and institutional 
differences are so substantial that they constrain the current co-operation. 
However, a closer co-operation would require the differences to decline. The 
differences are primarily linked to the fact that the co-operation both embraces 
parts from new and old EU Member States. There is one block of Scandinavian 
subnations and one block that consist of the subnations from the young 
democracies. In contrast to the new EU Member States, the Scandinavian block is 
characterised by a flat hierarchy, where civil servants have a wider authority to 
make decisions. Moreover, politicians in Scandinavia are to a higher extent 
involved in the working process in contrast to other countries. 
These differences can sometimes cause a problematic situation in the SC and 
the MCs’ decision making processes. Subnational civil servants from Sweden and 
partially Denmark explain that due to the fact that it is a part of their culture to 
have politicians in committees like these, they have also appointed some 
politicians. Yet, the subnational servants agree that their politicians do have a lack 
of knowledge since they do not work with the co-operation full-time. This implies 
that the Swedish and Danish delegations sometimes feel that they are 
comparatively weaker compared to other delegations consisting of only civil 
servants, or alternatively they must have one civil servant for each politicians 
during the meetings in order to advice them. On the other hand, since the civil 
servants from Sweden and Denmark participate jointly with the politicians their 
delegation has more authority to take decisions on behalf of their regions. Other 
participants from the other countries are more limited and very often they cannot 
take decisions until they have conferred with employees in higher position in their 
subnation. Consequently, this can contribute to two kinds of frustrations. Firstly, 
some do not understand why politicians who lack knowledge must participate and 
secondly some have no understanding for why the decision-making process must 
be so long (SN.SWE1, SN.EUPOM, JTS, AUTHOR). 
A second cultural and institutional difference, as previous mentioned, is that in 
some countries, for example Lithuania, there is no strong and evident regional 
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level. This complicates the process for subnational actors to independently 
influence the co-operations progress, since national and regional level is about the 
same. 
Finally, there are also several different cultural and institutional customs less 
serious but nevertheless constrain a smooth co-operation. For example a polish 
actor explains that all official documents must be stamped on every page in 
Poland. “We sometimes did not know if paper from Sweden were valued or not 
since they were not stamped”, she remembers. Some Swedes were on the other 
hand not very pleased to buy stamps only because Poland required it (N.PL2). 
Furthermore, irritation has been a factor several times, thus Swedish and Danish 
actors consider themselves as more organised and structured. One Swedish 
subnational actor expresses that in the beginning it was “chaos” and that they 
never got the documents they were promised (SN.SWE1). 
Despite these cultural and institutional differences, a wider understanding and 
mutual trust has grown during the first years of co-operation. According to the 
theory it can be stated that the co-operation started on fairly bad premises. Firstly, 
past networks or strategies which covered the whole South Baltic area were 
absent. Secondly, it was only a few of the participants that knew each other 
beforehand. Thirdly, as indicated above it was to some extent difficult for the 
subnational actor to be of the same opinion and to understand each other. 
However, most interviewees think that this is gradually changing. One 
interviewee describes it like a process. He remembers the bad co-operation 
climate in 2006, but declares that after “we got to know each other and we got 
more and more friendly” (SN.EUBAL). The head of the JTS and the EU’s 
representative also refer to the current trustful climate in the meetings and think 
that the co-operation is more mature now than before (JTS, EU1).  
In contrast, according to one subnational actor this trustful and mutually good 
relationship is only prevalent in a core group; between the staff in the JTS, the 
Contact Points and the Managing Authority. Participants in the SC and the MC 
who do not see each other that often still have not had the opportunity to build up 
the trust among them. The subnational actor, with very long experience from 
different kinds of co-operations, also sadly recognises how Swedish and Danish 
people are unjustified suspicious of Polish people, which sometimes hampers a 
deeper co-operation. Furthermore, considering the shift of participants in the SC 
and the MC but also the shifts of people in more leading positions that have taken 
place (SN.DK) it may result in a lack of a longer personalised trust, which a co-
operation often relies on. To conclude the last factor under the theme strategic 
unification and relation resources, concerning an understanding and mutual trust 
is on an adequate level of which corresponds to what a policy network require. 
Although, the mutual trust does not include all participants and definitely not the 
whole population within the cross-border co-operation, which further is a 
requirement for a policy community. 
In sum, considering the technical factors and the shared vision the South 
Baltic co-operation is more similar to an issue network than a policy network. 
However, the three last factors which were outlined in the theory are reasonably 
fulfilled in correspondence to a policy network. Consequently, the strategic 
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unification and the relation resources are not that strong that subnational actor 
would have the capacity to deepen the co-operation towards a policy community. 
But still they may be able to maintain the policy network depending on how 
further horizontal factors are fulfilled. 
8.2 Common knowledge resources and leadership 
As indicated above the writing process of the South Baltic’s Operational 
Programme was not unproblematic; different stakeholders had diverse frames of 
references, focused their analysis and understanding on different issues and had 
competing priorities. This should per definition mean that there was a lack of 
common knowledge resources. It has also been pointed out that there still are 
some divergent visions in what forms subnational actors want to cooperate in, 
which further would support the assertion that there is a lack of common 
knowledge resources. However, a cross-border co-operation can have different 
degrees of common knowledge resources. Three criteria were outlined in the 
analytical framework and what type of common knowledge resources is required 
for each form of co-operation. 
The first criterion is fulfilled in the South Baltic co-operation. All interviewees 
experienced that they have access to available information. The JTS and the 
Contact Points play an important role to support different actors with available 
information. In addition several chapters in the Operational Programme, written 
by the consultant, also describe the co-operation area and define its problem from 
different points of view. 
The second criterion regarding opportunities to absorb new ideas and learn 
from each other is also partly fulfilled. Polish stakeholders notice how much they 
learned from Swedish and Danish actors. They state that Sweden and Denmark 
have more experience of international co-operation and of co-operation within the 
framework of Interreg (SN.PL, N.PL1). A representative for the Managing 
Authority tells that they often ask Swedish and Danish civil servants for advice. 
She says that they are “never showing us off” they just help us in a pedagogical 
manner. In contrast, Sweden and Denmark also learn about the systems in the new 
EU Member States (N.PL1). Nevertheless, the learning process is mostly one 
directional, from the old EU Member States to the new. This further confirms that 
the third criterion is not fulfilled. 
The third criterion, to provide knowledge of analogues manner is not the case 
within the South Baltic co-operation. Another stakeholder gives an example and 
claims that Germany and Lithuania contribute with less ideas and knowledge. It is 
on the other hand understandable, since those have invested less financial 
resources in the co-operation (SN.EUBAL). In sum, the common knowledge 
resources in the South Baltic are on such a level that is sufficient for a policy 
network. For a deeper co-operation a more equal contribution would be preferred. 
In order to maximize the utilization of the knowledge resources some form of 
leadership is beneficial. Whereas the leadership is performed by the national 
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states, the EU or the subnational actors make a considerable difference. If the 
subnational level should have a chance to influence and determine whether the 
South Baltic co-operation’s opportunities ought to be maintained and deepened it 
is advantageous if they exercise the leadership by themselves. This is however not 
the case in the South Baltic co-operation, albeit leadership cannot really be 
defined. All interviewees appoint different leaders that adhere to both the 
subnational and national level as well as the EU level. It is quite clear that the 
leadership is shared. One of the participator in the SC and the MC refers to the 
last meetings and claims that it was obvious that different stakeholders both from 
the subnational and national level take responsibility for the co-operations 
progress (SN.EUBAL). Consequently, the leadership is not merely exercised by 
subnational actors and there is definitely no leadership that challenge and 
problematise the concept of the national state, as could be the case in a policy 
community. Rather, the leadership is on such level that is required for a policy 
network. 
8.3 Mobilisation capacity 
There are three forms of mobilisations, to which different co-operations rely on; 
politicians’ support, officers’ enthusiasm and public support. 
Firstly, a policy network like the South Baltic co-operation depends on 
politician’s support. The local parliaments or equivalent must accept the co-
operation before the establishment, and obviously they did so in the case of the 
South Baltic co-operation. Consequently, the politician’s support is on a sufficient 
level required for a policy network. However, several subnational officials had 
desired a more active support from politicians in order to satisfy a democratic 
representation. They claim that their relations to politicians are to inform them 
and not to communicate with them. Furthermore, the officials had hoped that 
politicians were more prepared for the meeting and had a higher competence 
(SN.GER, SN.SWE, SN.DK). Several countries do not have any politicians in the 
SC and MC. A closer co-operation, like in a policy community could be difficult 
due to the lack of interest and participation from politicians. 
Secondly, the officers’ enthusiasm seems diverged. One interviewee states that 
there is “enough will to overcome administrative, legal and cultural differences” 
(JTS). In contrast, it appears that several officers have left their duties and the co-
operation, where the reasons cannot really be defined. One interviewee does for 
example tell that the previous head of the JTS resigned and she states that “he was 
due to the whole organisational issues basically tired of the situation” (N.PL1). 
Moreover, the earlier discussion about how subnational actors consider how to 
reshape the structure of the programme does also confirm some form of 
dissatisfaction among the civil servants. In sum it seems like the officers’ 
enthusiasm is sufficient in order to maintain the co-operation but a deepening of 
the co-operation is probably not possible considering the bureaucratic interest. 
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Thirdly, public support has been difficult to evaluate partly due to the simple 
reason that citizens are not aware about the cross-border co-operation’s existence. 
One stakeholder states that this programme is not established in the public sphere 
(SN:EUPOM). Interviewees also indicate that media is very uninterested to write 
anything about the programme, which implies that the programme still is very 
much unknown to the public (JTS, SN.GER). However, the JTS and the Contact 
Points use different methods to inform about the programme. Nevertheless, the 
promoting is concentrated on reaching potential project partners and not the 
general public (JTS). Finally, the potential project partners’ interest may often be 
diverged. The author of the programme states that the problem with these kinds of 
programmes is the attractiveness to project partners. Since programmes often 
hamper bigger projects several project partners do not see any added value. An 
unanswered question is how big the public support could be when the interest 
from project partners still is rather limited. 
In sum, the internal mobilisation within the cross-border co-operation is 
adequate but it is not strong enough. The subnational actors themselves would not 
be able to maintain the co-operation without any external support and have the 
capacity to deepen the co-operation fails. 
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9 Conclusions 
This thesis has sought to examine whether cross-border co-operations in the 
framework of Interreg can strengthen or undermine the power of the nation-state. 
Two operational questions and a developed analytical framework have constituted 
a guide for the analysis. 
The first of the two operational questions; what and whom drove the process 
to establish the South Baltic cross-border co-operation, was examined through a 
decision-making model adopted by Kingdon. It was found that the establishment 
process was not driven by a single defined problem in the South Baltic area; rather 
it was a compound of different policy streams that were joined and which decided 
the outcome. Originally, there was a diverse range of ideas of how to co-operate. 
However, it was the long-standing cross-border co-operation Euroregion Baltic 
that embraced most of its subnations in the current South Baltic co-operation that 
was the contributing factor to the cross-border co-operation and that it should be 
an Interreg programme. Their idea was that they through Interreg funding could 
start to implement the Joint Development programme, which they on subnational 
level had agreed upon without any influence from the national level. 
When the EU for its new Cohesion period 2007-13 declared that the 
regulations should be changed and land-sea cross border co-operations should be 
possible; a so called policy window opened for cross-border co-operation in the 
framework of Interreg in the South Baltic area. Consequently, EU’s action can be 
seen as the starting-point of the establishment process. However, it was later the 
national actors that became the prime force in the establishment process. The 
Swedish government saw greater opportunities for more EU-funding compared to 
other countries and a stakeholder on national level invested remarkably both in 
time and energy in order to establish a cross-border co-operation within the 
framework of Interreg. It is obvious that the national government in Sweden 
estimated substantial advantages with a programme like this. 
The Swedish government, in line with the other countries’ governments and 
the EU, were not in favour of having two programmes in South Baltic area; one 
programme for Euroregion Baltic and one for the Euroregion Pommerania. In 
contrast, they preferred a bigger programme that not necessarily was compatible 
with old co-operation structures. The establishment process was therefore driven 
in accordance with the national states’ strategy. The subnational actors supported 
and also worked for the establishment of the South Baltic co-operation, but if the 
EU and the national governments had not constrained them they would have 
prioritised other forms of co-operation. 
The fact that the national level and the EU did not allow Interreg funding to 
long-standing cross-border co-operations like Euroregion Baltic and Euroregion 
Pomerania, implies that the national governments in the current co-operation 
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structure have more influence on the agenda setting than they would have if the 
old structures would be transformed into an Interreg programme. Furthermore, 
establish a total new co-operation compared to develop the old ones, makes the 
new cross-border co-operation less political, which diminish the chance for the 
cross-border co-operation to undermine the power of the nation-state. 
The third research question focuses on present time and concerns what 
potential subnational actors have to maintain and deepen their cross-border co-
operation compared to the EU and the national states. Linked to the first question 
of a more general character it is assumed that if the influence of the national state 
determine the cross-border co-operations’ opportunities to be maintained or 
deepened, it is not likely that the power of the nation-state is undermined. On the 
other hand, power of the national states can in a long-run be hollowed out if 
subnational actors are united to work towards a closer co-operation with less 
power dependence upon the EU and the national governments and if they have 
more operational discretion. In order to answer the third research question an 
analytical framework was developed, which considered both a vertical and a 
horizontal dimension. 
The vertical dimension explains the multilevel structure, which the cross-
border co-operations are embedded in. From the employing of the constructed 
ideal types it can be concluded that the South Baltic co-operation, like a policy 
network, has a high level of power dependence on the nation states and the EU. 
The cross-border co-operation is dependent upon external financial resources and 
has a high legal dependence, which results in a limited operational discretion. Due 
to lack of resources the cross-border co-operation cannot initiate bigger projects. 
EU guidelines regarding the structure and the contents of the programmes do also 
constrain the operational discretion. Furthermore, the fact that national actors take 
part in the co-operation’s Steering Committee and Monitoring Committee makes 
subnational actors within the co-operation less independent. According to the 
vertical dimension it is clear that it in the current situation it is the EU and the 
national states that influence and determine the co-operation’s opportunities to be 
maintained and deepened. 
Through the examination of the reinforcement from the national governments 
and the EU it can be concluded that there are opportunities to maintain the co-
operation. From the EU’s point of view the reinforcement for cross-border co-
operations is generally strong in particular regarding the South Baltic co-
operation, since it embraces both subnations from new and old member states. 
Most national states do also see several advantages that can strengthen the 
national states as a whole. The national reinforcement is not especially directed 
towards South Baltic co-operation; instead the national level holds a macro-
thinking which also is visible in the new Baltic Sea Strategy. The national states 
generally have an encouraging approach towards all kinds of cross-border co-
operations and see them as a tool in order to strengthen their own political 
objectives. Some countries, especially Germany do not recognise how the South 
Baltic co-operation can strengthen the national states, however they would not 
reject to a maintaining of the South Baltic co-operation thus the cross-border co-
operation do not undermine the power of the national states. 
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A deepening of the cross-border co-operation is from the national view not 
likely as the current co-operation structure is optimal. As it is today; 
representatives from the national governments take part in the decision-making 
process, control the development of the co-operation and can also take advantage 
of the co-operation. A deeper co-operation like the ideal type policy community 
would only imply less control by the states and the advantages are from the 
national point of view estimated to either be diminished or unchanged. The EU’s 
idea of changing the funding system to next cohesion period in terms of directly 
funding the programmes rather than letting the funding go through the national 
level may result in cross-border co-operations less dependent on the national 
level. Similarly, the EU also plans to increase the total amount of Interreg funding 
which may result in closer cross-border co-operations. In sum, from a vertical 
point of view a maintaining is possible due both the position on the EU and the 
national governments. A deepening would, albeit EU’s support, probably not be 
possible due to various degree of commitment from the national governments. 
However, a cross-border co-operation’s opportunities to be maintained or 
deepened cannot only be examined through a vertical dimension. The subnational 
actors can also influence and determine the cross-border co-operation’s future. In 
the analytical framework, the horizontal dimension outlined different factors of 
what needs to be fulfilled; if the subnational should be able to influence the cross-
border co-operation’s opportunities to be maintained or deepened.  
It can be concluded that subnational actors do not have the capacity or the 
ability to deepen their co-operation. This conclusion can be drawn since 
subnational actors are neither satisfied with the size of the population nor the 
geography of the cross-border region. The economical disparities between the 
subnations and the diverse visions for action and intervention within the co-
operation are also too wide for subnational actors own ability to deepen the co-
operation. The cultural and institutional differences are also evaluated as being too 
visible for the subnations own capacity to deepen the co-operation. The 
understanding and mutual trust exist, but not to the extent that is required for a 
closer co-operation. Furthermore, common knowledge resources and leadership 
were examined. Also from this point of view a deepening can be difficult since 
the subnations do not provide knowledge of analogues manner. Moreover, there is 
no leadership at subnational level that can specify the direction on the co-
operation and keep the co-operation on track, which makes it difficult to deepen 
the co-operation without a leadership from either the national states or the EU. 
Finally, the mobilisation capacity at subnational level is also too weak for the 
subnational actor’s own opportunity to deepen the co-operation. There is a lack of 
interest and participation from politicians. The officers’ enthusiasm seems to be 
on an adequate level. However, several subnational actors have left their duties 
within the co-operation and many still want to reshape the outline of the 
programme, which makes a deepening of current co-operation structure difficult. 
A maintaining of the co-operation from the horizontal dimension may 
however be possible. The cultural and institutional differences do not to a wider 
extent hamper the co-operation and there is an understanding of mutual trust 
between a core group of the most active within the co-operation. All subnational 
  51 
actors have access to available information, to absorb new ideas and learn from 
each other. Furthermore, there is enough will to overcome administrative, legal 
and cultural differences. Although, it is clear that the subnational actors’ capacity 
and ability to maintain their co-operation is rather limited without support from 
the EU or the national states. 
From examining both the establishment process and how different actors can 
influence the co-operation’s opportunities to be maintained or deepened it can be 
concluded that the South Baltic co-operation is a cross-border co-operation in the 
hands of the national states and the EU. The national states and the EU established 
the cross-border co-operation as they considered correct following their political 
objectives. Subnational actors desired something else but still thought the South 
Baltic co-operation to be an acceptable compromise. The fact that the national 
states were highly involved in the establishment process implies that the process is 
more comparable to a top-down process than a bottom-up. Furthermore, as 
national actors exceedingly drove the process to establish the South Baltic co-
operation it is also in the present co-operation reflected that the national states are 
the ones which primarily determine the co-operation’s opportunity to maintain or 
deepen. This is due to the fact that subnational actors are not too well compatible 
and do not have their own agenda. Rather the co-operation is embedded in a 
macro-thinking about how the whole Baltic Sea and the nations along the sea 
should be strengthened. A final conclusion is therefore that a cross-border co-
operation like the South Baltic co-operation in the framework of Interreg 
strengthens rather than undermine the territorial state system. 
The situation might be different if the EU and the national states had allowed 
long-standing cross-border co-operations, like the Euroregions to be eligible for 
Interreg funding. The subnational actors would then be more compatible, the co-
operation would have its own agenda and the result may even be better since they 
have long experience of cross-border co-operations on voluntary basis. However, 
the national governments’ influence would then probably decrease and a macro-
thinking of the whole Baltic See could be constrained. This thesis do not seek to 
give any recommendations but if the EU wants to support a wider bottom-up 
perspective they should consider old co-operation structures before they establish 
new cross-border co-operations. If they rather see the Interreg funding as 
instrument to fund border regions and strengthen the national states as a whole; 
cross-border co-operations like South Baltic can play an important role. 
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10 Executive summary 
The overall purpose with this thesis has been to consider whether cross-border co-
operations in the framework of Interreg are strong enough to undermine the power 
of the nation-state or whether they on contrary only may be an instrument in order 
to further the governments’ own goals. In order to respond to this a case study on 
the South Baltic cross-border co-operation was carried out. The aim with the case 
study has been to answer two operational research questions which are linked to 
the overall purpose. The first of these questions asks: What and whom drove the 
process to establish the South Baltic cross-border co-operation? The following 
question addressed is: How and to what extent can actors at the subnational level 
contra actors at the national level and the EU influence and determine the South 
Baltic cross-border co-operation’s opportunities to be maintained and deepened? 
Through the examination of both the establishment process and of how different 
actors can influence the co-operation’s opportunities to be maintained or deepened 
the intention has been to facilitate the examination regarding whereas cross-border 
co-operation funded by the Interreg strengthen or undermine the power of the 
nation-state. It is assumed that; if the process was not driven by subnational actors 
or if the subnational actors are not compatible to an extent where they single-
handedly can influence the co-operation’s opportunities to be maintained and 
deepened, then it is not likely that the cross-border co-operation could undermine 
the power of the nation-state. 
The method of the thesis is as mentioned a case study. Moreover, different 
methods have been applied in order to examine the different kinds of the 
questions. Concerning the establishment process there were already theories that 
could be applied and that only partly needed to be adjusted in order to fit the 
phenomena under study. In contrast, it was necessary to develop an analytical 
framework for the last research question concerning how different actors can 
influence and determine the co-operation’s opportunity to be maintained and 
deepened. The developed framework was inspired by the method of Structure – 
Agency in order to study both a vertical and a horizontal dimension. The vertical 
dimension in similarity to the structure perspective deals both with what structures 
constrain and also what they enable. That implied that the vertical dimension 
attempted to clarify the cross-border co-operation’s power dependence upon the 
EU and the national governments, and how the EU and the national governments 
can enable or constrain a maintaining or deepening of the co-operation. Moreover, 
the method of ideal types was used in order to contextualise the vertical 
dimension. The horizontal dimension, in similarity to an agency perspective 
examined what ability and capacity subnational actors themselves have to 
maintain or deepen their co-operation. 
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In order to gather knowledge about the South Baltic co-operation and examine 
different actors’ attitudes fourteen face to face interviews were carried out; three 
telephone interviews and one questionnaire. Both experts and respondents 
interviews were applied and the interviews lasted on average 1.5 hour. The 
interviewees represented different countries and were either a stakeholder at 
subnational level, at the national level or a representative from the European 
Commission. One interview was also conducted with the head of the Joint 
Technical Secretariat and one with the author of the programme.  
To summarise the theoretical chapters of the thesis; one chapter focuses on 
how to analyse the establishment process, another on the vertical dimension and 
the last on the horizontal dimension. A decision-making model adapted by John 
W. Kingdon aimed to be the basis of how to understand the establishment process. 
The chapter was structured after three terms used by Kingdon; the garbage can 
model, policy windows and policy entrepreneurs. The garbage can model carries 
relevance when multiple actors are involved in a decision-making process and it 
clarifies how the outcome depends on how different policy streams are processed 
and joined. The model’s purpose was to enable an illustration of what policy 
streams that existed before the decision to establish the South Baltic co-operation 
was taken, in order to compare subnational actors’ earlier positions with the 
outcome. The theory about policy windows explains how policy streams are 
joining and was aimed to facilitate an explanation of what factors that determined 
the South Baltic to be established when it was. The policy entrepreneurs are the 
ones that couple the policy streams and make a decision possible. Whereas the 
policy entrepreneurs represent the national or subnational level which makes a 
considerable difference. If the national actors are the driving force it is significant 
that the cross-border co-operation is an instrument for the states’ own policy 
objectives. 
The vertical dimension is theorised through the three regional ideal types; 
issue network, policy network and policy community. The construction of the 
ideal types can be seen as categories along a continuum and was inspired by work 
from B.H Jørgensen and R.A.W. Rhodes. Issue network is the most loose co-
operation form and policy community has the closest integrated structure of cross-
border co-operation. The ideal types are constructed in order to clarify; hallmarks 
of different cross-border co-operations, what a maintaining and deepening of the 
co-operation actually would mean, how power dependence upon the EU and the 
national governments varies in relation to the ideal types, and consequently how 
the power of the national governments can be differently affected due to the 
structure of the co-operation. 
The ideal types were also used in the chapter about the horizontal dimension. 
For a loose form of co-operation like an issue network the counter-parts do not 
have to be very compatible, but are on the other hand due to limited resources 
limited in which activities and projects they can carry out. Consequently, an issue 
network with less operational discretion cannot in comparison to a stronger policy 
community undermine and challenge the nation-state. If the subnational actors 
should be able to influence the co-operations’ opportunities to be maintained or 
deepened some factors must be fulfilled. These factors must for example to a 
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higher extent be more fulfilled if subnational actors’ should be able to deepen a 
policy network towards a policy community, than what for example is required 
for maintaining an issue network or a policy network. The different factors were 
divided into three themes; strategic unification and relation resources, knowledge 
and leadership resources, and mobilisation capacity. For a policy community, 
which most probably can challenge the power of the national governments within 
the co-operation area, strategic unification and relation resources implies that the 
cross-border co-operation should be of an appropriate size in terms of population 
and geography. Furthermore, the cross-border co-operation should have a shared 
vision, preferable a common identity, culture and institutional similarities, an 
understanding of other stakeholders within the co-operation and a mutual trust. 
Concerning the knowledge resources and the leadership it is for a policy 
community required that all stakeholders should have access to available 
information, opportunities to mutually absorb new ideas from each other and 
knowledge should preferably have different origins. The leadership should be 
performed from a key person at subnational level. Mobilisation capacity for a 
policy community implies that the cross-border co-operation should be reinforced 
by local and regional politicians, is backed up by officers’ enthusiasm and has a 
public support. 
From the above mentioned method and theory the South Baltic cross-border 
co-operation was examined. Concerning the establishment process of the South 
Baltic co-operation, the process started when the EU opened a so called policy 
window and for the new cohesion period 2007-13 and declared that land-sea 
cross-border co-operations could be eligible for Interreg funding. There was then 
at that point in time a diverse range of policy streams of how to co-operate. The 
subnational actors who were most committed along the South Baltic lobbied for 
that the long-lasted cross-border co-operation Euroregion Baltic which embraces 
the regions of Denmark, Lithuania, Poland, Russia and Sweden should be 
transformed into an Interreg programme. However, it was the effort of a policy 
entrepreneur at national level that primarily was the reason that the South Baltic 
co-operation was established in the way it is. He, in contrast to subnational actors 
wanted, in line with the most national governments and the European 
Commission, bigger programmes that not necessarily were built from old co-
operation structures. The outcome became what most national governments had 
worked for and due to the national level’s high influence the establishment 
process is more comparable with a top-down process than a bottom-up. 
The examination of the question about how different actors can influence and 
determine the co-operation’s opportunities to be maintained and deepened started 
from defining the character of the South Baltic co-operation and stated that the co-
operation is from the constructed ideal types most comparable to a policy 
network. This implies that the co-operation has a high level of power dependence 
upon the EU and the national states in terms of; financial resources, operational 
discretion and legal dependence, and power of the nation-state can barely be 
affected if the co-operation is not deepened towards a policy community. Due to 
high power dependence; the national level and the EU can to a large extent 
influence and determine the cross-border co-operation’s opportunities to be 
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deepened or maintained. It was also examined that their reinforcement for the 
South Baltic co-operation is embedded in a macro-thinking, where the South 
Baltic co-operation may be an important instrument in order to reach general 
political objectives as strengthen the national states and the Baltic Sea area. 
Current co-operation structure is from the national point of view the most optimal. 
As it is today; representatives from the national governments take part in the 
decision-making process, control the development of the co-operation and can 
also take advantage of the co-operation. A deeper co-operation, like the ideal type 
policy community, would only imply less control by the states and the advantages 
are from the national point of view estimated to be diminished or unchanged. 
However, if the subnational actors are very compatible and have a willingness 
to co-operate they may also have the opportunity to maintain and deepen their 
cross-border co-operation. Nevertheless, it was demonstrated that the subnational 
actors in the South Baltic do not have the capacity to maintain or deepen their co-
operation without any external influence. This is due to the fact that they do not 
fulfill the factors that are required. Strategically they think that the cross-border 
co-operation do not have an appropriate size of population and geography. The 
vision about what issue to co-operate in is diverged. There is still after the Cold 
War quite strong development disparities and cultural and institutional differences 
between the subnations. The different subnations within the co-operation do also 
not contribute with knowledge of analogues manner and there is no subnational 
leadership that could promote a maintaining or deepening of the co-operation. 
Furthermore, the internal mobilisation is too weak; in terms of subnational 
politicians’ support, officers’ enthusiasm and public support. 
The final conclusion of the thesis was that; due to the fact that establishment 
process to a high extent was driven by stakeholders at national level and that it 
primarily is the EU and the national governments that can influence and determine 
the South Baltic cross-border co-operation’s opportunities to be maintained and 
deepened, the South Baltic cross-border co-operation is a cross-border co-
operation which is in the hands of the national states. To conclude, a cross-border 
co-operation like the South Baltic co-operation in the framework of Interreg 
strengthens rather than undermine the nation-state. 
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